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WICKREMASURIYA v. MARY NONA
NLR24V26
1922
Present: De Sampayo J.
WICKREMASURIYA v. MARY NONA.
186-P. C Kandy, 8,034.
Ordinance No. 5 of 1889-Meaning of the term " brothel. "
A place to which men resorted for purposes of prostitution with women who were
to be found in the house is a, brothel within the weaning of the term as used in
Ordinance No. 5 of 1889. The occupation of a house or room by a single
prostitute may not constitute it a brothel. It is not necessary to make a house
of ill-fame a brothel that women should resort to it from outside; it is
sufficient if prostitutes reside in the house and men visit them there for
immoral purposes.
THE
facts appear from the judgment.
Hayley, for accused, appellant.
May 22, 1922. DE SAMPAYO .J---
The accused, Mary Nona, has been charged under section 1 (1) of
Ordinance No. 5 of 1889 with having kept and managed a brothel at Mary Nona
Mahaiyawa in Kandy on March 10, 1922. The complainant is the
Police Inspector of Kandy, and he called as his witness the Rev.
Mr. Dant of the Baptist Mission. The defence was that this was a
case of mistaken identity, and that the accused was at the time in
question at Purijjala, about thirteen miles away from Mahaiyawa.
The Police Magistrate, however, held that the evidence failed to
establish to his satisfaction that the accused was not at Mahaiyawa
at the time mentioned by Mr., Dant, viz., 9.45 P.M. I have no reason
to disagree with this finding. As regards identity, Mr. Dant was
quite sure that the accused was the woman whom he met at the
house. The Police Magistrate discusses this matter also, and is
satisfied with Mr. Dant's evidence, and I am unable to say that he
is wrong.
Mr. Hayley, for the accused, has raised another objection in appeal, namely,
that the evidence does not prove that the house was a brothel. In the Ordinance
there is no definition of the term, but in Pieris v. Magrida Fernando,[1]
Withers J., relying on an English case (Singleton v. Ellison[2]), said that a
brothel was a place to which persons of both sexes resorted for the purpose of
prostitution. I myself followed that case in Morris v. Cornelis.[3] But in a
more recent case Schneider J. enunciated a view which makes the matter worthy of
reconsideration, and which at all events appears to me to render the Ordinance
more effective in its operation. For in Silva v. Suppu [4] the learned Judge
expresses the opinion that the Ordinance used the word " brothel," not in the
strict English law sense, but as commonly understood locally, that is to say, it
is a place " to which men resorted lor purposes of prostitution with women who
were to be found in the house." The particular language of Singleton v. Ellison
(supra), which discusses the meaning of the word, appears to me to be due to the
peculiar circumstances of that case, for there a woman who used to receive men
into her rooms for the purpose of sexual intercourse with herself alone was held
not liable to be convicted for
keeping a brothel." The occupation of a house or room by a single prostitute may
not constitute it a brothel, but I do not myself" see that the exigency of
language or of law requires that, in order to make a house of ill-fame a
brothel, women should resort to it from outside, and that it is not sufficient
if prostitutes reside in the house and men visit them there for immoral
purposes. The note to Singleton v, Ellison given in the Laws of England, vol. 9,
p. 542, shows that a good deal turned in that case on the nature of the charge
made against the woman.
Foot notes:
1 (1895) 1 N. L. R. 212,
2 (1895) L. R. 1 Q, B. 607
3 3 Bal. N. C. 48.,
4 (1919) 21 N. L. R. 119,
I think that the evidence in the present case, though not voluminous, is
sufficient to show that the accused's house was a brothel. Mr. Dant was accosted
by a young man, and taken to the house, where the accused received him and
conducted him to a room. She there introduced him to a young woman, prep
