In Re An Application Under Ordinance No. 20 Of 1919 Against Cantlay

Present : De Sampayo J,

In re an Application under Ordinance No. 20 of 1919
against CANTLAY.

Vexatious Action Ordinance, No. 20 of 1919-Ability to pay costs of unsuccessful action-Number of actions-Possible cause of actions.

In an application by the Attorney-General under section 2 (1) of the Vexatius Actions Ordinance, No. 20 of 1919, for an order that no civil legal proceedings shall be instituted by the respondents in any Court unless they obtain leave of the Supreme Court, the - fact that respondents have paid the costs of various unsuccessful actions is not a ground for refusing the application, if the litigation was in fact vexatious.

" Nor is the question dependent on the number of actions instituted, nor upon any consideration whether there may not have been possible cause of action in some of the case's. What we have to look at is the general character and result of the number of actions brought by the respondents."

THE facts are set out in the judgment.

 Illangakoon, C.C, for the applicant

D. B. Jayatileke, for the respondents.

May 28, 1981. DE SAMPAYO J.-

This is an application by the Attorney-General under section 2 (1) of the Vexatious Actions Ordinance, No. 20 of 1919, for an order that no civil legal proceedings shall be instituted by the respondents in any Court unless they obtain leave of the Supreme Court and satisfy the Court that such legal proceedings are not an abuse of the process of Court, and that there are prima facie grounds for such proceedings. Section 2 (1) of the Ordinance enacts as follows: -

" It shall be lawful for the Attorney-General to apply to the Supreme Court or a Judge thereof for an order under this Ordinance, and if he satisfies such Court or Judge that any person habitually and persistently instituted vexatious civil legal proceedings in any Court, and whether against the same person or against different persons, such Court or Judge may, after hearing such person or giving him an opportunity of being heard after assigning counsel in case such person is unable on account of poverty to retain counsel, order that no civil legal proceeding shall be instituted by that person in any Court unless he obtains the leave of the Supreme Court or a Judge thereof, and satisfies the Court or Judge that such legal proceeding is not an abuse of the process of the Court, and that there is prima facie ground for such proceeding."

The first respondent, Mrs. Laura Rose Cantlay, is the mother of the second and the third respondents, and was, at all times relevant to this application, their attorney in Ceylon. The respondents were entitled to certain undivided shares of and in an estate known as Mipitiyakande estate, situated in the district of Kegalla, which was the subject of a partition action No. 3,135 in the District Court of Kegalla. By deed No. 4,594 dated December 9, 1911, the respondents and one Charles Francis Cantlay, who was another son of the first respondent and a shareholder in the said estate, agreed to sell and convey their undivided shares to G. A, H. Vanderspar and E. H. A. Vanderspar for a sum of £7,500 sterling's and with a view of enabling them to make a valid sale they further agreed that they would move to withdraw the said partition action No. 3,135 or join in any such motion or application. The respondents having failed to carry out the said agreement No, 4,594, Messrs. Vanderspar on September 11, 1912, instituted action No. 34,263 of the District Court of Colombo against the respondents to compel specific performance of the said agreement. Meanwhile, decree had been entered in the partition action, whereby a. specific portion of the said estate was allotted to the first respondent, and another specific portion to the second and third respondents and the said Charles Francis Cantlay, and a sum of Rs, 5,333.89 had been awarded as compensation to

the first

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