1924         [CROWN CASE RESERVED .]

Present: Bertram C.J., De Sampayo J., and Garvin A.J.

 THE KING v. RENGASAMY.

3-P. C. Kegalla, 2,522.

Murder committed while in a state of drunkenness-Self-induced intoxication-Penal Code, ss. 78, 79, and 294-Knowledge-Intention.

In all cases of self-induced intoxication it is a question of fact for the jury, whether the accused actually entertained the intention necessary to constitute the crime.

Section 79 is intended to deal with two classes of cases :-

(a) Cases in which knowledge is an essential element of the crime.

(b) Cases in which intention is an essential element of the crime.

In the first of these cases it imputes to the drunkard the knowledge of a sober man. In the second of these cases it also imputes to the drunkard the knowledge of a sober man in so far as that knowledge is relevant for the purpose of determining his intention.

What is the knowledge referred to ? In the first case it is the knowledge specified in the Code as the essential element of the crime. In the second case it is the " knowledge of the nature and consequences of the act." The law does not allow the drunkard to say that owing to his intoxication he did not know that a particular stab with a particular instrument would be likely to cause the death of a human being. But if in fact the degree of intoxication was such that the man imagined that what he was striking was not a man but a log, proof of this circumstance would not be excluded. On the contrary it would be the very strongest evidence that the man had formed no murderous intention.

Subject to the qualifications above explained, the question whether an intoxicated person is guilty of murder depends upon whether he has formed .what I may describe as a murderous intention. That is a question of fact. For the purpose of determining that question of fact the jury must attribute to him the knowledge of the nature and consequences of his act that would be attributed to a sober man. If they consider that the degree of intoxication was such that he could not have formed a murderous intention or any intention at all, they must acquit him of murder and consider the question of culpable homicide. For the purpose of that question they must attribute to the accused within the limits above explained the knowledge of a sober man. The law will not allow the accused to disclaim that knowledge, and if they come to the conclusion that a sober man in the prisoner's position would have known that he was likely to by his act to cause death, they must convict him of culpable homicide. This is

subject to the special case dealt with by paragraph " Fourthly " 1924 of section 294, and also subject to the four exceptions enumerated under the same section.

Per GARVIN A.J.-The imputation of knowledge authorized by section 79 should be confined to those cases in which knowledge and intention are specifically stated in the alternative as elements of an offence.

Paragraph " Fourthly " of section 294 of the Penal Code applies only to cases in which without any definite intention to injure a person deliberately takes the risk of inflicting death. The words, "without any excuse, &c," are intended to except such cases as where a military officer lawfully fires upon a mob, or where the captain of s vessel takes the risks contemplated in section 74.

Apart from this special case and apart from the special exceptions enumerated under section 294, culpable homicide, as distinguished from murder is a question of knowledge; murder is a question of intention.

THIS case was referred to a Bench of three Judges under section 355 of the Criminal Procedure Code by Bertram C.J. by the following order :-

On May 9, 1924, at the Kandy sessions, one Krishnan Rengasamy was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. He committed the crime when in a state of drunkenness. I directed the jury with reference to the meaning of secti