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SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE DEHIOWITA v. BOTEJU
NLR28V311
1926 Present: Garvin A. C .J.
SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE, DEHIOWITA v. BOTEJU.
380-P. C. Avissawella, 11,368.
Buddhist Temple-Public place-Police Ordinance, No. 16 of 1865, s. 60 (2).
A Buddhist temple is not a public place within the meaning of section 60 (2)
of the Police Ordinance.
APPEAL from a conviction by the Police Magistrate of
Avissawella.
E. G. P. Jayatileke, for accused, appellant.
July 9, 1926. GARVIN A. C. J. -
In this case there is no appeal as of right except upon a matter of law
certified in the petition of appeal. The point taken is that
there is no evidence that the accused, who was convicted of behaving in a
drunk and disorderly manner, did so on a public thoroughfare or in a public
place. The general effect of the evidence is that the appellant, who was
slightly the worse for liquor, was one of a large concourse of Buddhists who
collected at a certain Buddhist temple. He appears to have behaved in a
troublesome manner and was arrested by the Police Inspector. The Police
Constable states that he saw him misbehaving and using abusive language at the
turn to the temple. He was then standing on a path which led to the temple. The
question arises whether a Buddhist temple is a public place within the meaning
of section 60 (2) of Ordinance No. 16 of 1865. It is contended that a Buddhist
temple is not a place to which the members of the public have access as of
right; it is only Buddhists who can claim a right to enter a Buddhist temple,
and that right can be exercised only for the purposes of worship. It is said
that the members of the public who do not profess the Buddhist religion have no
right to enter a Buddhist temple. Even in the case of Buddhists themselves, it
is said, the temple authorities are vested with certain rights in the control
and management which
would entitle them to exclude from the premises persons whom for good reason,
they think, should not be permitted to enter the premises. It is contended by
Counsel that the principle on which Withers J. acted in the case of Pietersz
v. Wiggin,1
if applied to the case of a Buddhist
temple leads to the conclusion that it is not a public place within the meaning
of the provision under which .the accused was
1 2 Cey. L. Rep. 111.
charged. There is no evidence that the path which led to the temp is a public
path, or is a path in respect of which the public have such rights of user as
would bring it within the category of a public thoroughfare, nor in the case of
this temple that the conditions regards ingress and egress as of right are
such as would justify Court of Law in holding that it was a public place within
the meaning of this section.
The appeal must, therefore, be allowed, and the conviction set aside.
Set aside.
