1927 Present: Schneider J. and Maartensz A.J.

SORLENTINA v. DE KRETSER.

142-D. C. Colombo, 3,090.

Administration-Secretary appointed administrator-Sale of properly by order of Court before issue of letters-Estate Duty Ordinance, No. 8 of 1919, s. 19 (4).

An administrator, to whom letters of administration have not been issued, has no authority to sell the property of the estate, oven with the sanction of Court,

Where an order was made declaring the Secretary of the Court entitled to apply for letters of administration to an estate, the Commissioner of Stamps has no right to have a citation issued on the Secretary under section 32 of the Estate Duty Ordinance, until the latter has obtained letters of administration
APPLICATION to sat aside a sale of land held in pursuance of  an order of Court entered in testamentary proceedings. The Secretary of the Court applied for letters of administration on November 2, 1926. Order nisi was entered, and eventually on March 16, 1927, the order was made absolute. The only respondent to the application was the widow, the present petitioner, who by petition requested the Court to appoint the Secretary as administrator. On March 10, 1927, the Commissioner of Stamps by his letter addressed to the official administrator drew attention to his notice of assessment and threatened to take steps under section 32 of the Estate Duty Ordinance unless the money was paid within 14 days. On April 14, 1927, a citation was issued on the Secretary. On May 13, 1927, the official administrator moved to sell by public auction the premises in question. The motion was allowed and tile property sold, whereupon the widow moved to set aside the sale.

F. A. Hayley, K.C. (with M. C. Abeywardene), for appellant.- All the proceedings in the case are of an extraordinary nature. No notice of sale was given to the widow. The conditions of sale are irregular, as no provision is made for confirmation or otherwise by Court of the sale. Section 19 of Ordinance No. 8 of 1918 makes some person liable for the payment of estate duty. The respondent was not liable as he was not an administrator. In any event the estate consisted of movables as well as immovables, and the former might have been sold for recovery of the estate duty. The respondent had no power .to make the application for sale as administrator, as an administrator's status is dependent on his

having obtained letters of administration. In this case letters had not been granted up to the date of filing of the petition (see 1 Williams on Executors 314 and 1 Salkeld at p. 301). The sale was a nullity, and the Court could not confirm a sale which was void.

Counsel also referred to Krause v. Pathumma. 1

H. V. Perera, for respondent.-The District Court had jurisdiction to make an order for sale. The purchaser obtained the land at a sale in pursuance of an order of Court. The conditions of sale were approved by Court. A bona fide purchaser for value need only look to the order for sale.

The respondent has acted as administrator, and when letters are granted the doctrine of relation back will operate.

Respondent by inter-meddling with the estate became an executor de son tort.

The order absolute is sufficient authority for the respondent to lave made the application for sale as administrator.

The appellant having taken up one attitude in .the lower Court cannot take up an inconsistent attitude here.

The word jurisdiction must be construed broadly. The Court has jurisdiction to make a right order as well as a wrong order.

Counsel cited Perera v. Lcbbe,2 Andirishamy v. Silva,3 Hassem r. Silva,4 Silva v. Salman,5 Babun Appu v. Vaidasehera,6 Fernando r. Soysa,7 and Abdinkhan v. Alikhan.8

F. A. Hayley, in reply.-Court has no jurisdiction to make an order to sell a third party's property. Under the Estate Duties Ordinance the Court itself can make an order for sale.

Counsel referred to Hendric