D. A. ARIYARATNE v. BARLIS DE SILVA WICKRAMARATNE.
NLR32V235
1929
Present : Fisher C.J. and
Maartensz A.J.
D. A. ARIYARATNE v. BARLIS DE SILVA WICKRAMARATNE.
164-2). C. Galle, 25,371.
Defamation-Statement made on
privileged occasion-Evidence of express malice- Burden of proof.
Where a statement defamatory of the plaintiff was made by the defendant in
answer to a question put by a superior officer to which he was bound to reply,-
Held, that the statement was made on a privileged occasion.
In such a case the burden is on the plaintiff to displace the privilege by proof
of express malice.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the District Judge of
Galle.
H. V. Perera (with him Ameresekere), for defendant, appellant.
De Zoysa, K.C, (with him Rajapakse), for plaintiff, respondent.
October 15,1929. FISHER C.J.-
In this case the plaintiff sued the defendant, who is a Vidane Arachchi, for Rs.
3,000 as damages for defamation. The plaintiff was an applicant for the post of
Attendance Officer and " on February 22, 1926, the Assistant Government Agent
held an inquiry .... to select a suitable person from among the application for
the above-mentioned post". Paragraph 4 of the plaint is as follows :-"The
defendant at the above inquiry defamed the plaintiff by falsely and maliciously
seating to the Assistant Government Agent that the plaintiff had been convicted
and fined Rs. 50 and Rs. 25 in two criminal prosecutions". On February 24, 1927,
the plaintiff gave notice of the action to defendant in accordance with section
461 of the Civil Procedure Code an it is not without significance that the
plaint is dated February 20, 1928, that is to say, approximately two years after
the alleged defamation. The evidence shows that the defendant was present at the
meeting in his official capacity. The learned Judge in his judgment says that
the defendant " who was present when questioned stated that the plaintiff had
been convicted and fined twice, once Rs. 50 and the other time Rs. 25 ". The
statement that the defendant was questioned is in accordance with the evidence
.given by the defendant and the mudaliyar whom he called as a witness. It is
clear that the occasion on which the statement was made was a privileged
occasion and the onus therefore lay on the plaintiff to prove that the statement
was made maliciously, that is to say, that the defendant availed himself of the
privileged occasion for stating what he knew to be false, or had no reason to
believe was true, in order to damage the plaintiff. Having regard to the
circumstances, I think that the statement which admittedly was not true was
defamatory. It would have been taken to indicate to the person to whom it was
made that the character of the plaintiff was open to objection. It is clear,
however, that the statement was not volunteered, but was made in answer to a
question put by a superior officer to which the defendant was bound to reply. I
gather from the judgment of the learned Judge that he did not take into account
the fact that the occasion was a privileged occasion and therefore did not
regard the case from the point of view that the onus of proving malice lay on
the plaintiff. I do not think that the evidence given by the plaintiff himself
on the point of express malice can be considered seriously. He says : " About
two days prior to February 22, I met defendant and he spoke to me. He reminded
me of, the wrongs my father had done to him and said that I would never succeed
in my application ". I do not think this statement can be relied upon. Had such
an occurrence taken place the natural thing to have happened was that the
plaintiff who was in the presence of a number of people of whom he says " Almost
everyone there knew me. They knew I bore a good character", would have at once
told the Assistant Government Agent of what had taken place two days previously.
He did not do this nor did he refer to it in a petition which he addressed to
the Gov