SOBITA TERUNANSE AND ANOTHER v. SARNAPALA TERUNANSE AND OTHERS
NLR34V342
1933 Present :
Garvin J. and Maartensz A.J.
SOBITA TERUNANSE AND ANOTHER v. SARNAPALA
TERUNANSE AND OTHERS.
134-D. C. (Inty.) Chilaw, 9,496.
Jurisdiction-Resistance to
proprietary decree-By judgment-debtor- Complaint to Court-Jurisdiction of Court
passing the decree-Civil Procedure Code, ss. 325 and 326.
Where resistance is offered to the execution of a decree for possession by
persons who are bound by the decree, the Court which passed the decree has
jurisdiction to inquire into the complaint.
Where resistance is occasioned by persons claiming the property in good faith,
the question of jurisdiction is determined by the ordinary tests which govern
jurisdiction in a regular action.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the District Judge of
Chilaw.
H. V. Perera, for appellant.
R. L. Bartholomeusz, for respondents.
January 18, 1933. GARVIN J.-
The petitioner complained to the Court under the provisions of section 325 that
the officer charged with the execution of a decree for possession in his favour
was resisted and obstructed by the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh,
and eighth respondents to his petition and that they did so at the instigation
of the first respondent. An interlocutory order under section 377 was duly made
by the Court. The respondents duly appeared and objected to the jurisdiction of
the Court. Their objection was that the lands of which the officer endeavoured
to deliver possession to the petitioner being lands outside the local limits
assigned to this District Court it had no jurisdiction to entertain or
investigate the complaint. The learned District Judge upheld the objection that
he had no jurisdiction to investigate the matter of the complaint and dismissed
the petition. The only question for us is this question of jurisdiction; the
complaint has not yet been investigated.
Section 325 and the sections which follow it have been enacted for the purpose
of providing certain summary remedies in cases in which there is resistance to
the execution of decrees for the possession of property. What the law prescribes
is that a complaint may be addressed to the Court, and that that Court should in
the first instance investigate the matter of the complaint and if it is
satisfied that resistance or obstruction was caused by the judgment-debtor or by
some person at his instigation " commit the judgment-debtor or such other person
to jail for a term which may extend to 30 days and direct the judgment-creditor
to be put into possession of the property ". If in the course of this
investigation the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction had been
offered by some person other than the judgment-debtor claiming in good faith to
be in possession of the property on his own account it shall direct the petition
of complaint to be numbered and registered as a plaint in an action between the
decree-holder as plaintiff and the claimant as defendant. There is first a
jurisdiction to exercise certain punitive powers so as to make a Court's decrees
effective against the person or persons against whom they have been entered by
compelling the judgment-debtor or any person acting at his instigation to submit
to that decree upon pain of being punished by a term of imprisonment. There can
be no question that that jurisdiction is vested in the Court which passed the
decree. The words of section 325 which permits the judgment-creditor " to
complain thereof to the Court" when read in the context, in which they appear
clearly indicate that the Court to which the complaint was to be made was the
Court which passed the decree and in the nature of things it is but natural and
proper that resistanced. to the execution of its decrees by persons who are
bound by those decrees should be dealt with by the Court whose decree is thus
flouted. But where upon its investigation the Court finds that the resistance
wa