1934 Present: Poyser J.

SAMYNATHAN v. WHITEHORN.

APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS ON THE
TEA EXPORT CONTROLLER.

Writ of mandamus-Application to register name as proprietor of tea estate- Controller's decision to register person in possession-Applicant's right to question decision by writ-Remedy open by way of appeal-Ordinance No. 11 of 1933.

The decision of the Tea Export Controller given in a quasi-judicial character cannot be questioned by a Writ of Mandamus.

The proper person to be registered as the proprietor of a tea estate under section 12 (2) of the Tea (Control of Export) Ordinance, No. 11 of 1933, is the person in possession of the estate.

When the Ordinance provides a remedy by way of appeal from the decision of the Tea Export Controller, a writ of mandamus will not lie to reverse the decision.

THIS was an application for a writ of mandamus on the Tea Export Controller directing him to inquire into the title of the applicant to a tea estate and to register his name as the lawful owner and proprietor of the estate.

L. M. D. de Silva, K.C. (with him Basnayake, C.C.), for Tea Controller, respondent, objected to the application on three grounds : -

(i) The Controller is justified in concentrating on the question of possession to decide proprietorship.

(ii) Even if the Controller is not so justified, the decision was given by him while acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, and he has therefore exercised his discretion in the matter.

(iii) The applicant has a statutory remedy by way of appeal. Therefore a writ of mandamus should not be granted.

The definition of proprietor in Ordinance No. 11 of 1933 is practically identical with the definition of proprietor in the Rubber Control Ordinance, No. 24 of 1922. In In re S. E. Fernando 1[ 26 N. L. R. 211] it was held that the Rubber Controller was right in issuing coupons, under almost similar circumstances to this, to the person in possession. Adjudications on complicated questions of title are essentially matters for a court of law, and it is impossible for the Controller to decide such questions. The person in possession is the only person who can make use of the coupons.

A writ of mandamus does not lie to reverse an erroneous decision at law. (Shortt on Mandamus at p. 265.) A different view was taken by Avory J. in R. v. Registrar of Companies2[ (1912) 3 K. B. 23]. But this view is not followed in the later case of R. v. Port of London Authority3[(1884) 12 Q. B. D. 461].

It is a clear principle of law that where other remedies are open a mandamus will not be granted. Counsel cited R. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue 4[(1907)2  K. B. 764.], Passmore v. Oswaldtwistle Urban Council 5[ (1898) A. C. 307.], R. v. Assessment Committee of the City of London6[(1883-84) 12 Q. B. D. 461.], and Application for a Writ of mandamus on the Principal Collector of Customs.72 C. L. W. 330]

M. T. de S. Amarasekere (with him T. S. Fernando), for applicant.- There is a difference between rubber coupons and tea coupons in that the latter are by statute (section 26 (4) of Ordinance No. 11 of 1933), expressely made saleable without the production of tea. Therefore it is not necessarily the person in possession who can make use of the tea coupons.

The Ordinance contemplates the giving of coupons only to the proprietor. The definition of "proprietor" in the Ordinance is extended only to include those in possession through the owner. In this case the registered proprietor who claims to be in possession has not a vestige of rightful title. However difficult it may be, there should be an adjudication on the question of title. Otherwise there is no discretion exercised by the Controller. Here our documentary title was not even looked at. Such refusal to investigate raises a matter of law, and a writ of mandamus should issue ordering the Controller to make such investigation. See, R. v. Justices of Kesteven 1[(1