KING v. WICKREMASINGHE
NLR36V135
1934 Present:
Maartensz A.J.
[FIRST WESTERN SESSIONS, 1934. ]
KING v. WICKREMASINGHE.
49-P. C. Colombo, 4,165.
Joinder of
charges-Three offences against three different persons-Evidence of similar
acts-Criminal Procedure Code, s. 179-Evidence Act, s. 14.
Where an accused was charged with having committed three acts of indecency with
three different persons within a period of twelve months,-
Held, that the inclusion of the charges against three different
persons in the same indictment was not obnoxious to section 179 of the Criminal
Procedure Code.
Held, further, that the evidence of similar acts committed by the
accused on the persons mentioned in the indictment was inadmissible.
Held, also, that separate trials should not be ordered in such a
case merely because of the possibility that a Judge or Jury might suspect each
of them to be true.
THE
accused was charged before the First Western
Sessions of the J- Supreme Court with having committed three acts of gross
indecency with three different boys within a period of twelve months.
E. H. T. Gunasekera, C.C., for the Crown.
S. W. R. Dias Bandaranayake (with him Rajakaruna), for accused.
March 7, 1934. MAARTENSZ A.J.-
The indictment in this case charged the accused with having committed three acts
of gross indecency with three different boys within a period of twelve months.
The accused pleaded to the indictment; but before it was read to the Jury two
objections Were taken to the indictment. It was contended that section 179 of
the Criminal Procedure Code did not justify the indictment
the offences were against
different persons. Section 179 of our Code corresponds to section 234 of the
Indian Code. A conflict of opinion in Indian as to whether the three offences
must be committed against the same person has been met by an amendment of the
section 234. The words " whether in respect of the same person or not" being
inserted in the section after the word " offences ".
With due deference to the Indian decisions to the contrary, I prefer to
follow the decision of Wood Renton C.J. in the case of The King v. Senanayake
1[1 (1917) 80 N. L. R. 83.] where he held that section 179 of the Code did not
require that the three offences with which the accused was charged should be
against the same person. I respectfully agree that if that was the intention of
the legislature it would have been provided for by the insertion of the words "
against the same persons" in the section. In support of this view I would point
out that these words are to be found in section 5 of the Larceny Act of 1881: a
section in many respects similar to section 179 of the Code.
It was also argued that the joinder of the three charges would prejudice the
accused as it would lead the Jury to suspect that each of them severally must be
true. It was contended that this argument was accepted by Ennis A.C.J. in the
case of The King v. Wijesinghe 2[ 2 (1919) 6 Ceylon Weekly Reporter 327.] Ennis
A.C.J. no doubt refers to the argument in his judgment; but I am clearly of
opinion that he acquitted the accused in that case because inadmissible evidence
had been received and acted upon by the District Judge who tried and convicted
him.
It was held by Ennis A.C.J. and Wood Renton C.J. in the cases referred to that
it was always open to the Courts on the application of an accused person to
direct separate trials. But I do not think separate trials should be ordered
merely because of the possibility that a Judge or Jury might suspect each of
them must be true. Such an argument could be addressed to this Court in every
case in which three charges are combined at one trial in pursuance of the
provisions of section 179 of the Code. And there would be no purpose in
retaining the section in the Statute Book. In my judgment there must be more
substantial grounds for directing separate trials than that contained in the
argument I have dealt w