1938   Present : Maartensz and Moseley JJ.

KANDASAMYTHEWAR v. CASSIM.

150-C.R. Jaffna, 3,905.

Appeal-Leave to appeal in Court of Requests' case-Time within which the appeal should be perfected-Sundays and public holidays not excluded- Civil Procedure Code, ss. 754 and 756.

The Supreme Court in granting leave to appeal in a Court of Requests' case ordered that the appeal should be perfected within fourteen days of the receipt of the record by the Court of Requests.

In this case the record was received by the Court on July 9, 1937, the petition was filed on July 22, security was tendered and the bond filed on July 26.

Held, that the appeal had not been perfected within the time fixed by the Supreme Court.

Sundays and public holidays are not excluded in the computation of the time allowed to perfect the appeal.

Held further, that the Supreme Court had no power to grant relief under section 756 of the Civil Procedure Code. Murugesu v. Arumugam et al. (16 Cey. L. Rec. 228) followed.

THIS was an appeal from a judgment of the Commissioner of Requests, Jaffna, from which the appellant had been granted special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.

E. B. Wikramanayake, for the respondent, raised a preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal.-The appeal has not been perfected within the time (fourteen days) ordered by the Supreme Court which heard the petition for leave to appeal and laid down the condition under which leave was granted. The fourteen days from the date of the receipt of the record by the Court below should be reckoned inclusive of Sundays and public holidays. It is conceded that if such days be excluded the appeal is in time. The provisions of section 756 of the Civil Procedure Code have no application here in so far as they relate to the calculation of time within which an appeal should be preferred to the Court of first instance in cases where there is a right of appeal. Those statutory provisions refer only to such cases. Here we have a specific order of the Supreme Court defining a time limit into which the mode of calculation laid down in section 756 cannot legitimately be imported. See in this connection the case of Murugesu v. Arumugam and another [1 16 Cey. L. Rec. 228.]

N. Nadarajah (with him G. E. Chitty and S. Mahadeva), for the appellant.-The provisions of section 756 either apply or have no application in cases where leave is obtained from the Supreme Court. If they are to be applied they must be applied as to the whole of them or not at all. It cannot be said that they apply in part, namely, as to the mode in which the appeal is to be perfected, and not as to the manner in which the time is to be computed. It would be highly inconvenient and misleading to have two different systems of computation where the mode of perfecting of the appeal is one and the same in both cases. If the provisions of the

section have no application at all, the appellant is still in time for the reason that the appeal was filed within the fourteen days proper. It was only the perfecting of security which was delayed ; but the very necessity for such security only arises from the requirements of this identical section 756. It would be inequitable therefore to apply its provisions only in part.

May 10, 1938. MOSELEY J.-

This appeal was brought by leave of the Supreme Court, which ordered that the appeal should be duly perfected within fourteen days of the receipt of the record by the Court of Requests. It was called for hearing before me on March 23, when Counsel for the respondent raised the objection that the appeal had not been perfected within the stipulated lime. The circumstances differ in no material fashion from those which existed in the case of Murugesu v. Arumugam and another[116 Cey L.Rec.228], and whilst I was prepared to follow the decision of Fernando J. in that case, I ordered the point to be argued before a Bench of two J