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KING v. ANDREE et al.
NLR42V495



King V. Andree Et Al.,

 

1941     Present : Howard C.J. and Soertsz J.

 

THE KING v. ANDREE  et al.

54-56-D. C. (Crim.) Colombo, 128.

 

Conspiracy-Elements of offence-Agreement to commit an offence not essential-Acting together with a common purpose sufficient to establish offence-Conviction based on evidence of accomplice-Failure of judge to com­ment on rule of evidence-Power of Supreme Court to examine evidence in support of the rule-Penal Code, s. 113 (a).

 

In a charge of conspiracy under section 113 (a) of the Penal Code it is not necessary to prove an agreement to commit an offence either directly or inferentially. It is sufficient to prove that the accused acted together with a common purpose for or in committing an offence.

 

Where a Judge in acting on the evidence of an accomplice does not actually say in his judgment that he is not unmindful of the rule with regard to corroboration of such evidence, it is open to the Supreme Court in appeal to examine the evidence to see whether there was corroboration of the evidence in material particulars and connecting each of the accused with the offence of which they have been convicted,

 

The fact of the existence of a relationship of master and servant between the first accused on the one part and the second and third accused on the other does not negative any inference of conspiracy.

 

THE three appellants were tried on two counts before the District Court of Colombo.

 

On the first count it was alleged that they at Colombo with others did agree to act together with a common purpose for committing an offence, viz., receiving or negotiating bets on horse races, other than taxable bets, an offence under section 10 of the Betting on Horse Racing Ordinance and thereby committed the offence of conspiracy under section 113B of the Penal Code.

 

In the second count the charge against them was that in pursuance of the said conspiracy they received or negotiated with a person unknown a bet, which said bet was other than a taxable bet and that thereby they committed an offence punishable under section 10 of the Betting on Horse Racing Ordinance.

 

The learned District Judge acquitted them of the charge on the second count and convicted them of the charge on the first count.

 

H. V. Perera, K.C. (with him E. B. Wikremanayake), for the accused, appellants.-In the first count of the indictment the three accused were charged with agreeing to act together with a common purpose for com­mitting the offence of receiving illegal bets. The agreement is a definite act and was alleged to have taken place at a point of time within a certain period. Later the indictment was amended to extend the period of time. This extension of the period was improper and unfair to the accused because it enabled a whole series of offences to be vaguely st


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