1942 Present: Howard C.J.

GNANAMUTTU V. CHAIRMAN, URBAN COUNCIL

(BANDARAWELA), FIRST RESPONDENT, AND

URBAN COUNCIL, BANDARAWELA, SECOND
RESPONDENT.

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR AN INTERIM INJUNCTION
AGAINST THE SECOND RESPONDENT AND IN THE MATTER OF
CONTEMPT OF COURT IN CONNECTION THEREWITH.

Injunction-Issue of order for interim injunction-Order restraining interference with petitioner's water supply-Attempt by second respondent to forestall the order of the Supreme Court-Contempt of Court-Courts Ordinance, ss. 20 and 47-Civit Procedul1e Code, s. 663.

On November 10, 1941, the petitioner gave notice to the second respondent, the Urban Council of Bandarawela, of an' action which he intended to institute in the District Court of Badulla to obtain a perpetual injunction restraining the Council from interfering with the water supply to petitioner's premises at Bandarawela.

On November 11, the petitioner applied to the Supreme Court for an interim injunction against the Council, restraining the Council from interfering with or disconnecting the petitioner's water supply, pending the action. The order for an interim injunction was accordingly issued.

On December 22, 1941, the petitioner made an application to Court by way of motion, asking the Court to take cognizance of the contempt of court committed by the first respondent to disobeying the order of the Court and to direct the respondents to restore the water supply of the petitioner.

Held, that the Supreme Court had power, under section 20 of the Courts Ordinance, to issue a mandatory injunction and to order the respondents to restore the water supply to the condition in which it stood on November 10, 1941.

Held, further, that the 1st respondent, in taking steps to make it appear that the 'petit10ner's water supply bad been discontinued before notice of the interim injunction reached him, had' attempted to forestall the order of the Supreme Court and was guilty of contempt of court.

THIS was an application for an interim injunction against the Urban Council, Bandarawela, and for an order committing the Chairman of the Urban Council for contempt of court in connection therewith.

H. V. Perera, K.C. (with him E. F. N.' Gratiaen), for the second respondent.-This application is said to be under sections 20 and 47 of the Courts Ordinance, but it is really only under section 47. The allegation is that the injunction, issued under section 20, was defied by first respondent. A private party cannot obtain relief under section 47. A

matter of contempt of court is a matter which concerns the Court. A mandatory order, as prayed for in the application, cannot be made. The applicant may have his remedy by way of mandamus or by action in the District Court. To ask for a mandatory order on the second respondent, in an application for the committal of the first respondent for contempt of court, is an abuse of the process of Court.

R. L. Pereira, K.C. (with him E. F. N. Gratiaen), for the first respondent. As regards the contempt of court alleged to have been committed by the first respondent the sole question is whether work contrary to the order of Court was done subsequent to the receipt of the telegram. An injunction operates from the date of the order-Kerr on Injunctions, 1914 ed., p. 686. Notice of the order of Court reached respondent when the new connection had" been completed. On the question of the time at which the telegram was delivered, it is submitted that the received telegram delivery sheet (P 12A) is not a public document within the meaning of section 74 of the Evidence Ordinance. It does not prove the correctness of the entry made by the telegraph clerk. That can only be done by calling as a witness the person who made the entry-viz, the telegraph clerk. See, on this point, the remarks of Nihill J. in Gunasekere v. Gunasekere[(1939) 41 N. L. R.351 at p. 357. ]. It is submitted that