NORTH-WESTERN BLUE LINE COMPANY V. K. B. L. PERERA

1943 Present : de Kretser J.

NORTH-WESTERN BLUE LINE COMPANY, Appellant, and
K. B. L. PERERA, Respondent.

IN THE MATTER OP A CASE STATED TO THE SUPREME COURT (No. 3,089)
IN TERMS OF THE MOTOR CAR ORDINANCE AND THE OMNIBUS SERVICE
LICENSING ORDINANCE.

Omnibus Service Licences-Applications to run omnibus service on a definite route-Contest between two companies-Method of calculation of bus licences held by the rival companies-Omnibus Service Licensing Ordinance No. 47 of 1942, ss. 4 (b) and 6 (1) (e).

In considering applications for licences to run omnibus services on a route between two termini, the licences covering those points only should be taken into account in deciding which of two companies held the majority of licences.

Licences on the authority of which omnibuses could be used on that section of the highway and the highway beyond the two termini should not be taken into consideration.

THIS was a case stated to the Supreme Court by the Tribunal of Appeal under section 6 (a) of the Motor Car Ordinance, No. 45 of 1938, as amended by the Omnibus Service Licensing Ordinance, No. 47 of 1942.

The facts appear from the judgment.

R. L. Pereira, K.C. (with him J. E. M. Obeyesekere), for appellants.

H. V. Perera, K.C. (with him D. W. Fernando and Stanley de Zoysa), for respondents.

T. S. Fernando, C.C., for the Commissioner of Transport.

Cur. adv. vult.

June 21, 1943. DE KRETSER J.-

The case stated for the opinion of this Court arises from the following facts. The Kelani Valley Motor Transit Company, whom I shall call the respondents, and the Colombo-Ratnapura Omnibus Company, whom I shall call the appellants, are the parties concerned. The Commissioner took up for consideration applications for road service licences between Colombo and Ratnapura, and in dealing with them guided himself as he is required to do by Ordinance No. 47 of 1942, by the rules laid down in the first schedule to that Ordinance.

The question is whether he correctly interpreted the relevant rule.

At the hearing the debate was mainly regarding the meaning of the word " route ", incidentally bringing in the meaning of the expressions " same route or routes which are substantially the same ", and " licence . . . . authorising the use of omnibuses on such route or on routes substantially the same as such route ".

The appellants contended that " route " meant the route under consideration, and that was Colombo to Ratnapura, and licences covering those two points only should be considered in deciding which of them held the majority of the licences, while the respondents contended that " route " only meant the highway between the two points mentioned and the licences to be taken into account were those under the authority of which omnibuses could be used on that section of the highway and should include all licences which related to that section and the highway beyond the termini.

Between Colombo and Ratnapura the appellants held eleven licences and the respondents only six.

Between Colombo and points beyond Ratnapura, but still in the Ratnapura District, the appellants held seven and respondents seven.

The respondents, however, held six licences from Panadura to Badulla via Colombo and Ratnapura, and from Panadure to points in the Ratnapura District beyond Ratnapura four licences. While, therefore, the respondents were in a minority regarding the first two classes, they held the majority of the licences when all four classes were taken into

the reckoning. Even if the buses from Panadure to the Ratnapura District were taken into account, still the respondents were in a minority and the contest therefore raged round the six omnibuses which went as far as Badulla.

From the above statement it will be clear that consistency of argument necessarily means either the inclusion or the exclusion of the last three classes, and that it is incorrect to discus

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