1944 Present: Soertsz J.

GUNAPALA, Appellant, and MOHIDEEN, Respondent.

87-C. R. Colombo, 93,806.

Rent restriction-Right of appeal-Court of Requests-Matters arising under section 8-Not a final order-Ordinance No. 60 of 1042, s. 8, provisos (a) to (d).

No appeal lies from an order of the Commissioner of Requests in any of the matters arising for decision 'under provisos (a) to (d) in section 8 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Commissioner. of Requests, Colombo.

S. E. J. Fernando, for appellant.

M. I. M. Haniffa (with him V. Arulanbalam), for respondent.

Cur. adv. vult.

August 1, 1944. SOERTSZ J.-

A preliminary objection has been taken to the hearing of this appeal on the ground that there is no right of appeal from such an order as was made in this case in the court below, the Court of requests of Colombo.

It is well established by judicial interpretation that an action in ejectment on a contract of tenancy from month to month is not an action for debt,- damage,, or demand, but an action involving an interest in land, and that there is a right of appeal from a final judgment, or from an order having the effect of a final judgment pronounced in such a case.

But Ordinance No. 60 of 1942-an emergency measure-introduced a material change in the law by debarring landlords, in certain areas, from instituting such actions without the written authorisation of an Assessment Board; and also by prohibiting Courts of law in those areas from entertaining such actions, were they instituted, unless in the opinion of the Court, the rent was in arrear, or the tenant had given notice, or the landlord required the premises reasonably, or the premises were being used in an immoral, illegal, neglectful, or pestiferous manner. Under the common law, of course, a landlord dissatisfied for any- of these reasons need hardly have put himself to the occasion of pleading these matters and proving them. He could, unless he preferred devious ways, put an end to the tenancy by valid notice to quit. Even the most resourceful and dilatory tenant would have, in such a case, -to bow, sooner or later, to his landlord's demand. But the Rent Restriction Ordinance served to put the tenant in a much more secure position in regard to his tenancy. The tenancy cannot now be determined by the landlord merely giving proper notice to quit. The landlord could come into Court only if he had been authorised in writing by the Assessment Board, the decision of the Board being conclusive and final, or if the landlord not confident of being able to commend his action to the Board, or for some other reason, presented a plaint, as he is entitled to do, in the form of a plaint in an action for ejectment, there would have to be, in addition to the usual averments

in such an action, averments in regard to the clause or clauses in section 8 (a) to (d) on which he relied to have his action entertained. The tenant then would make his answer to that averment as well as to the other averments and a preliminary inquiry would take place for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether the Court has the power to entertain the action for ejectment in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction. In the case now before me the' landlord relied on the matters in clauses 8 (a) and (c) of the Ordinance and averred that rent was in arrear, and that he required the. premises for his own use and occupation. The tenant, however, denied the former averment and put the landlord to the proof of the latter. But he did not deny the tenancy, or dispute that he had been given valid notice to quit. The meaning of all this is that if this action had arisen before the Ordinance of 1942, a decree for ejectment would have been entered of consent, and that would, or at least, should, have been the end. of the case, there being no right of appeal from a consent decree.

The proceedings in this case show clear