Soertsz A. C. J., Keuneman S.P.J. And Wijeyewardene J.

1945 Present: Soertsz A. C. J., Keuneman S.P.J. and Wijeyewardene J.

IN THE MATTER OF A RULE ISSUED UNDER SECTION 47
OF THE COURTS ORDINANCE ON P. RAGUPATHY,
ADVOCATE.

Contempt of Court-Passage in petition of appeal-Calculated to bring Judge into contempt or lower his authority-Inadequate apology by respondent.

Rule was issued under section 47 of the Courts Ordinance on the respondent, an Advocate, in respect of a certain passage appearing in a petition of appeal addressed to the Court of Criminal Appeal, which he had drafted and presented for signature to the prisoners concerned.

The passage was in the following terms: -

" His Lordship suggested to witnesses for the prosecution answers which enabled them to shape the evidence in a manner which made the case for the prosecution more convincing than on the evidence as it otherwise stood ".

In his affidavit the party noticed averred that he had no intention to convey a sinister or derogatory meaning, maintained that the words used did not amount to a contempt of Court and added that in view of the fact that the Rule issued showed that it appeared to the Supreme Court that the statement in the petition of appeal was an unwarranted and offensive statement made in disrespect of the authority of the Court, he humbly expressed his regret for having made the statement.

There was nothing in the record to support or even to suggest that the learned trial Judge acted in the manner imputed to him. '

Held, (i) that, even if it were true that the respondent had no intention to convey a sinister meaning, the Court had to interpret the meaning of the language used, and in doing so to consider how it would be understood by the majority of those who read it; a petition of appeal would pass through many hands, viz., the persons who prepare and type it, officials at the jail, officials of the Supreme Court Registry, and others who have access to it.

(ii) that to the ordinary man the passage in question would convey a meaning so sinister, or at the least so derogatory, that it would bring the Judge into contempt or lower his authority.

Held, further, that the expression of regret contained in the respondent's affidavit was not a sufficient or satisfactory apology nor could it be taken into consideration in mitigation of sentence.

THIS was a Rule issued on the respondent, an Advocate, to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt in respect of a certain passage in a petition of appeal which he had drafted. The facts are set out in the head-note.

H. V. Perera, K.C. (with him N. E. Weerasooria, K.C., E. B. Wikremanayake, H, W. Thambiah, A. H. C. de Silva, G. E. Chitty, and H. W. Jayawardene), for party noticed.-The passage in the petition of appeal to which exception has been taken is fairly capable of an innocent interpretation. The word " suggested " has no sinister meaning. It only implies that leading questions were put to the witness-section 141 of the evidence Ordinance. The Judge was indeed entitled to do this under section 165 of the Evidence Ordinance. The word " enabled " shows

that the Judge did not intend the consequences. The mere fact that the statement was capable of a sinister meaning would not be sufficient to make it a contempt. It did not bring the authority of the Court into ridicule. The party noticed had made the statement in the petition of appeal only because he felt it his duty by his client to do so. An Advocate expects a generous interpretation of a statement made in the course of his professional duty. See Morogese Ayer v. Cathergamer 1.

G. Nagalingam, Acting Attorney-General (with him H. A. Wijemanne, C.C.) as amicus curiae-The only question is whether the passage as a whole imputed something to the Judge which was improper. It is submitted that the passage did impute to the Judge something of unfairness to the accused. No unqualified apology is

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