KING v. PILORIS FERNANDO ET AL
NLR47V97
[COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL]
1946
Present: Wijeyewardene, J. (President), Cannon and de Silva JJ.
THE KING v. PILORIS FERNANDO et al.
15- 17 M .C. Chilaw, 25, 917.
Evidence- Character of accused
-
Evidence of previous conviction of accused volunteered by prosecution witness in
the course of cross-examination-Undefended accused - Duty of Judge- Evidence
Ordinance, s. 54-Criminal Procedure Code, s. 230
Where, in a criminal trail before a Judge and Jury, a
prosecution witness, while being cross-examined by an undefended accused,
volunteered the evidence that the accused had been previously convicted for
perjury-
Held, that the evidence was inadmissible under section
54 of the Evidence Ordinance and I was the duty of the trial Judge to have
informed the accused, as he was undefended, that he had the right to apply for a
fresh trial.
Held, further although the Jury had been directed not
to act on such evidence there was a manifest irregularity and the trial Judge
should have discharged the Jury under section 230 of the criminal Procedure
Code.
APPEAL,
with leave obtained , from a conviction by a Judge and Jury.
M. M. Kumarakulasingham, for the 1st accused,
appellant, -The first accused was not represented by Counsel at the trial. In
the cross-examination by the 1st accused of the Crown witness Peter the fact
that the last accused was convicted for perjury was brought out. The question
put by the 1st accused was fair and related to relevant matter, i. e,
impartiality of witness, but the answer given by the witness was unfair and
introduced irrelevant matter, namely, bad character of the 1st accused. The
presiding Judge did not inform 1st accused of his right to submit that the trial
should proceed and the proceed and decided that the trial against all the
accused should proceed. He warned the Jury then and later in the summing-up to
disregard that evidence.
[WIJEYEWARDENE J.-An irregularity of this sort only gives the
accused the right to make an application that the trial shall not proceed, but
the Judge has a discretion either to allow or refuse the application. Has not
the Judge used his discretion in this case? See Rex v. Featherstone 1.]
As the accused was not informed of his right there is a
manifest irregularity. A direction to jury no to act on the particular evidence
is not adequate in the circumstances of this case-Rex v. Norton 2.
Further the Judge has decided that the case against all the
three accused should proceed. The indications are that the Judge has not
considered in particular the case of the 1st accused.
Foot notes
1 28
Cr. App. R.176.
2 (1910)
2 K. B. 500.
In Rex v. Firth
conviction was quashed in the case of an accused who was represented by Counsel
because a fresh trial was refused on application made by Counsel for the accused
when evidence of bad character was brought out against the accused by his own
Counsel. Rex v. Firth has not been overruled by Rex v. Featherstone.
In Rex v. Featherstone the appeal was dismissed because there was
a virtual admission of guilt by the accused.
The evidence against the accused is slender. If the accused
gave evidence a verdict of acquittal was possible but accused did not give
evidence as his previous conviction for perjury was known to the jury. Thus the
accused was substantially prejudiced in his defence and therefore the proviso to
section 5 (1) of the Court of Criminal Appeal Ordinance should not be applied in
this case.
Further there is a difference between our Court of Criminal
Appeal Ordinance and the English Act.
Our Ordinance makes provision for a retrial ; the English Act does not.
Therefore it is possible for this Court to interfere where the English Court of
Criminal Appeal would not interfere.
This is a case where the proviso to section 5 (2) of the
Court of Criminal