SELVANAYAKAM KANGANY v. HENDERSON
NLR47V337
1946 Present:
Jayetileke J
SELVANAYAKAM KANGANY, Appellant, and HENDERSON,
A. G. A., KEGALLA, Respondent.
941-M. C. Kegalla, 12,301.
Criminal trespass-Meaning of
?occupation? in section 427 of Penal Code- Occupation may be by oneself or
through agent-Difference between occupation by tenant and occupation by servant
after expiry of notice to quit-Intention to annoy-Penal Code, ss. 427, 438.
The Superintendent of a tea and rubber estate gave due notice
to the accused, who was a laborer occupying two line-rooms of the estate, that
his services would no longer be required and that lie should vacate the rooms.
The accused refused to vacate the rooms and was, thereupon, charged under
section 433 of the Penal Carlo with having committed criminal trespass by
unlawfully remaining in the two rooms ?with intent to annoy the Superintendent.
It was established that the Superintendent was in paramount
occupation not only of the estate but also of the line rooms and that lie had
the right to allot any rooms in the lines to the laborers and to change the
rooms occupied by the laborers as he wished.
The accused?s defence was that he was born and bred on the
estate, that the estate was his home, and that he intended to remain the estate
till he was able to build a house to move into. There was, however, no evidence
that the accused paid nay rent for I he rooms which he occupied or that he was
permitted to occupy them as a reward for his services. The accused?s occupation
of the rooms was, is fact, ancillary to the performance of the duties which he
was engaged to perform.
Held (i.) that the Superintendent was in occupation of
the two rooms within the meaning of section 427 of the Penal Code. The
occupation that is entitled to protection under the section may be by oneself or
through an agent;
(ii.) that the accused?s occupation of the rooms was not as
tenant hut as servant;
(iii.) that the accused, by remaining in the rooms after his
services were terminated, was guilty of criminal trespass. If annoyance to the
Superintendent was the natural consequence of the accused?s act and if the
accused know that it was the natural consequence, titan there was an intention
to annoy.
APPEAL
against a conviction from the Magistrate?s Court, Kegalla.
H. V. Perera, K.C. (with him S. Nadesan and C. S.
Barr Kumarakulasinghe), for the accused, appellant.-The conviction is bad on
the following grounds :-(1) The accused-appellant is a tenant. (2) The
line-rooms which the accused-appellant refused to leave were in the accused-
appellant?s occupation and not in the occupation of Rajapakse, the
Superintendent of the estate. (3) It cannot be said that accused- appellant
intended to annoy Rajapakse by remaining in the lines. (4) There is no intention
to annoy anyone in any way.
As regards (1). In the Privy Council case of The Calcutta Corporation v. The
Province of Bengal 1[1(1944)
A. I. R. (P.C.) 42 at 45.]
Lord Porter in his judgment makes it clear that where a servant occupies a
particular house of the master for the convenience of both of them the
possession by the servant is that of
tenant unless the servant is
required to occupy it for the better per. performance of his duties though his
residence is not necessary for that purpose or if his residence there is
necessary for the performance of lib duties though not specifically required.
On this aspect of the case there is the unchallenged
testimony of the accused that ho was born in these particular line rooms, lived
there all his life and that his father before him lived there. The accused was a
labourer in the estate employed by the present owner on the same terms as under
the previous owner. There is no evidence as to what those terms were. The terms
of service may and do actually vary in different estates.
The natural inference on these facts, on the authority of the
Privy Council. case cited (supra), i