1946 Present: Keuneman S. P. J., Wijeyewardene and Jayetileke JJ.

GUNARATNE, Appellant, and THELENIS et al., Respondents.

332-C. R. Galle, 25, 044.

Lessor and lessee-Expiry of term of notarial lease-Right of lessee to pleas the benefit of Rent Restriction Ordinance thereafter-Rent Restriction Ordinance, No. 60 of 1942, 8. 8.

A lessee can plead the benefit of section 8 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, No. 60 of 1942, where the premises in question were occupied by him under a notarial lease which has terminated by effluxion of time. The terms of the Rent Restriction Ordinance are wide enough to apply to premises leased as well as to premises held on a tenancy from month to month.

THIS was a case referred by Howard C. J., under section 38 of the Courts Ordinance, to a Bench of three Judges.

The reference was as follows: -

?The appellant in this case appeals from a judgement of the Commissioner of Requests, Galle, dismissing his action with costs. The appellant bought his action on an Indenture of Lease dated December 2, 1939, whereby he let to the defendants the premises described in the schedule for a period of four years terminating on November 30, 1943, at a monthly rental of Rs. 30. The appellant further alleged that notwithstanding the termination of the lease on November 30, 1943, the defendants have failed to deliver possession of the premises and were in unlawful occupation thereof to the appellant?s damage of Rs. 50 per month. The appellant claimed Rs. 250 as damages. The defendants in their answer pleaded that the premises in question were in the Municipal limits of Galle and that the appellant cannot maintain this action as he has failed to comply with section 8 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, No. 60 of 1942. The Commissioner found that the defendants were bound by the terms of the agreement embodied in the lease of December 2, 1939, but the defendants can plead the benefits of section 8 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance. He also found that the defendants are the tenants of the appellant after December 1, 1943, and that the appellant cannot maintain this action in view of section 8 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, No. 60 of 1942.

?Section 8 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance is worded as follows:-

?Notwithstanding anything in any other law, no action or proceedings for the ejectment of the tenant of any premises to which this Ordinance applies shall be instituted in or entertained by any Court, unless the Assessment Board, on the application of the landlord, has in writing authorized the institution of such action or proceedings:

Provided, however, that the authorization of the Board shall not be necessary in any case where-

(a) rent has been in arrear for one month after it has become due; or

(b) the tenant has given notice to quit; or

(c) the premises are, in the opinion of the Court, reasonably required for occupation as a residence for the landlord or any member of the family of the landlord or for the purpose of his trade, business, profession, vocation or employment; or

(d) the tenant or any person residing or lodging with him or being his sub-tenant has, in the opinion of the Court, been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance to adjoining occupies, or has been convicted of using the premises for an immoral or illegal purpose, or the condition of the premises has, in the opinion of the Court, deteriorated owing to acts committed by or to the neglect or default of the tenant or any such person;

For the purpose of paragraph (c) of the foregoing proviso, ?member of the family? of any person means the wife of that person, or any son or daughter of his over eighteen years of age, or any parent, brother or sister dependent on him?.

?The only point that requires consideration is whether the Commissioner was right in holding that these are premises to which the Ordinance applies. The exact point was considered by de Silv