1946 Present: Dias J.

DE SILVA, Appellant, and SIRIWARDENE, Respondent.

162-C. R. Colombo, 99, 325

Contract of tenancy-Rent recoverable-Retrospective effect of Rent Restriction Ordinance-Computation of standard rent-Proclamation in Gazette-Court can take judicial notice of it-Rent Restriction Ordinance, No. 60 of 1942, ss 3, 4, 5, 17.

Section 3 of the rent Restriction Ordinance makes it unlawful for a landlord to recover rent in excess of the authorized rent although the contract of tenancy was entered into before the Rent Restriction Ordinance became law and a higher rent was agreed upon. Section 17 of the Ordinance affords no relief to the landlord in such a case.

Where the tenancy is one in which the landlord pays the rates the ?standard rent? is determined by adding the annual value of the premises and the amount of rates leviable for the year and dividing the result by twelve.

A court can take judicial notice of the date on which the Rent Restriction Ordinance was made applicable to a particular locality by Proclamation.

APPEAL from a judgement of the Commissioner of Requests Colombo.

H. W. Jayewardene, for the plaintiff, appellant.

P. Navaratnarajah, for the defendant, respondent.

Cur. adv. vult.

November 1, 1946, DIAS J-

The appellant sued the respondent to recover rent for part of May and for the months of June to August, 1945, aggregating Rs. 58.00, in respect of premises bearing No. 71, Robert?s road, Kalubovila, which he had let to the respondent on a contract of monthly tenancy since September, 1939. He also asked for ejectment and damages on the ground that the respondent was overholding after the tenancy had been determined by notice.

The appellant stated that the rent agreed on from the very commencement of the tenancy was Rs.15.00 per mensem.

The respondent, in his answer, pleaded that the rent for the period in question had been duly tendered to the plaintiff?s proctor who refused to accept the same. He further stated that the Rent Restriction

Ordinance, No. 60 of 1942, having been proclaimed for this area on February 15, 1943, the ? standard rent ? for the premises was only Rs. 5.00 per mensem, and not Rs. 15.00. He had overpaid the appellant from February, 1943, to may, 1945, a sum of Rs. 270.00 in excess of what he was by law bound to pay. Giving the appellant credit for a sum of Rs. 20.00 for the months of June to September, 1945, he claimed in reconvention a refund of Rs.250.00.

The first question which arises is whether the respondent has proved the date on which the Rent Restriction Ordinance was applied to this locality. Section 2 (1) of the Ordinance provides that the Governor may, from time to time, by Proclamation published in the Gazette, declare that the Ordinance shall be in force in any area specified in the Proclamation, and appoint the day on and after which the Ordinance shall be in force in such area.

No evidence of this has been led at the trial, and the relevant Gazette has not been produced. It was held in Jayakodi v. Silva 1 [1(1943) 44 N. L. R. 379.] that a Court is bound to take judicial notice of the date on which an Ordinance has been brought into operation. In Edirisinghe v. Cassim2 [ 2(1945) 46 N. L. R. 334.] it was laid down that a Court could take judicial notice of the date on which a Defence Regulation came into operation. In an old case reported in Ramanathan (1877) page 10, It was held that a proclamation issued by the governor can be taken judicial notice of without proof. No doubt, this case was decided before the evidence ordinance become law, but I fail to see why a court cannot take judicial notice of a proclamation issued by the Governor, if it can do so in the case of a Regulation.

I, therefore, allowed the respondent?s counsel to produce the Gazette no.9,084 of February 12,1943, which shows that the ordinance was applied to the mount Lavinia district on February 15, 1946.

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