KING v. USMAN SUPREME COURT
NLR49V143
1948 Present: Soertsz S.P.J.
and Nagalingam J.
THE KING v. USMAN.
S. C. 223-D. C. Colombo (Criminal), 1,281.
Penal Code, ss. 443 and
490-Attempt to commit housebreaking-Accused caught trying to open a
window-Sufficiency of evidence.
Where an accused was caught attempting to open a window of a house- Held, that
the evidence was insufficient to sustain a charge of attempt to commit
housebreaking as it did not point clearly or necessarily to the conclusion that
he was trying to enter the house.
APPEAL from a
judgment of the District Judge of Colombo. Accused appellant in person.
J. A. P. Cherubim, C.C., for the Attorney-General.
January 15, 1948. SOERTSZ S.P.J.-
The accused in this case was charged with attempting to commit housebreaking
under section 443, read with section 490 of the Penal Code. The evidence upon
which this charge is based is the evidence of the complainant, which we accept
without any hesitation, that he found the accused attempting to open a part of a
window which was secured by means of a piece of wire. The other part of that
window had been securely fastened with a bolt. At the time the complainant found
the accused so engaged the accused had not succeeded in opening the window at
all. He was merely found in the act of trying to force open the window. He had
not even succeeded in opening the window to the extent of being able to
introduce his hand through the opening. In these circumstances the question
arises whether the charge of attempt to commit housebreaking is sustainable.
Crown Counsel says that a reasonable inference to be drawn from what the accused
was found to be doing is the inference that he intended to enter the house. That
is a reasonable inference, no doubt, but it is not the only reasonable inference
that can be drawn in view of the fact that the complainant appears, as is quite
easily understandable, to have acted rather precipitately in arresting the
accused at that stage without waiting till the accused proceeded to an extent
which would have made his action unequivocal. As matters stood at the stage at
which the accused was taken into custody it cannot be said, in our opinion, that
his action was unequivocal and that it pointed clearly and necessarily to the
conclusion that he was trying to enter this house. As Crown Counsel himself
submitted in the course of his argument, it may be that the accused wanted to
open that part of the window in order to peep into the house, and in that case I
do not think that a charge of attempt to commit house-breaking could be
maintained. Perhaps the accused did this just to spy out the possibility of a
successful entry into the house and it may be that when he discovered that there
were people in the room, he would have beaten a hasty retreat without entering
the house at all. In these circumstances, again, it would be impossible to say
that the accused was attempting to commit housebreaking.
In the circumstances I think this conviction must be set aside and the accused
acquitted.
NAGALINGAM, J.-I agree.
Accused acquitted.