1948 Present : Canekeratne and Dias JJ.
 
PERERA, Appellant, and PERERA,
Respondent.
 
S. C. 259-D. C. Avissawella, 4,773.

Married woman-Disposal of immovable property-Consent of husband in Writing- Void or voidable-Matrimonial Rights Ordinance-Married Women's Property Ordinance.
 
A woman married before July 1, 1924, cannot dispose of immovable property acquired before that date without the written consent of the husband.

APPEAL from a judgment of the District Judge, Avissawella.
 
H. V. Perera, K.C., with E. A. P. Wijeyeratne, for the plaintiff, appellant.
 
N. K. Choksy, K.C., with S. R. Wijayatilake and E. C. F. de Silva, for the defendants, respondents.

Cur. adv. vult.

March 22, 1948. CANEKERATNE J.-
 
This is an appeal by the plaintiff, a grand-daughter of one Ango Perera, from a judgment dismissing her action for declaration of title to a land.
 
Ango Perera became the owner of the land by two deeds dated April 1, 1907, and July 13, 1907, respectively; she made a gift in favour of the plaintiff by deed P 1 dated October 25, 1941, reserving a life-interest to herself and her husband and by deed 1 D 1 dated August 10, 1944, she transferred the same land with the consent of her husband to the first defendant, another grand-daughter-it purports to be a deed if sale.
 
As Ango Perera was married after the proclamation of the 1 Patrimonial Rights and Inheritance Ordinance of 1876, this land formed part of her separate estate. The right of a married woman to enter into contracts, and to make dispositions of her property under certain circumstances was recognised by this Ordinance (as regards the former, see sections 10 and 9, and 17 N. L. E. 357, as regards the latter see sections 9, 12 and 13). The second part of the Ordinance which contained sections 5 to 19 and sections 22 and 23 was repealed and the scope of her capacity to contract and of her rights was widely extended by the Married Women's Property Ordinance, No. 18 of 1923. The Ordinance applies to all married women, whether they were married before the date of the Ordinance, July 1, 1924, or after : certain persons are taken out of the purview of the Ordinance (section 3). The new law ought to be construed so as to interfere as little as possible with vested rights. A retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation. The repeal of sections 5 to 19, 22 and 23 is, according to the proviso to section 4, not to affect any right acquired while those sections were in force.
 
The Ordinance provided in effect that if a woman married on or after July 1, 1924, all her property no matter when acquired should be her separate property and she can dispose of any property belonging to her as if she were a feme sole (section 7 and section 5(1)). It contains certain provisions which are applicable to a woman married before this date. The position of such a woman is as follows :-(1) She is entitled to dispose of in manner previously mentioned in the Ordinance as a fame sole by deed or will as her separate property whatever accrued to her after the commencement of the Ordinance (section 10 (1)). The section applies to and affects all marriages contracted before the commencement of the Ordinance and alters with respect to such marriages in the manner indicated in the section the consequences of the marital relation. (2) She can make a gift of immovable property acquired before the Ordinance

to her husband. It was an existing right at the time of the passing of the Ordinance of 1923, and the new Ordinance does not alter this right. The Privy Council in Hulme King v. de Silva 1 stated that under section 5 of the Ordinance a wife is under no disability as regards covertures in disposing of her immovable property in favour of her husband. A married woman while the Ordinance of 1876 was in force could not dispose of any immovable property by a deed inter rivos. except w