1948  Present : BASNAYKE J.

KULASINGAM,

Petitioner and THAMBIAYAH, Respondent.

In the Matter of the Petition of Aiyathurai Varuna Kutlasingam of Jaffna under
section 77 of the Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Order in Council, 1946,
to have the Election of Alfred Leo Thambiayah to represent the
Electoral District of Kayts (No. 44) declared to be void.

Election Petition-Company having contract with Crown-Shareholder disqualified- Indirect benefit-Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946-Section 13 (3) (c).
 
A shareholder of a Company having a contract with the Crown for the providing of goods or services to be used in the service of the Crown is a person who is disqualified under section 13 (3) (c) of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946.
 
THIS was an election petition challenging the return of the respond- dent as Member of Parliament for the Electoral District of Kayts. Petitioner in person.-The respondent is disqualified by contracts P5 and P3 for being a Member of Parliament, in view of section 13 (3) (c) of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946. As a shareholder of the Cargo Boat Despatch Company, Ltd., the respondent enjoyed a benefit indirectly from the contracts. Under the proviso in section 3 of the House of Commons Disqualification Act, 1782 (22 Geo. 3, c. 45) no disqualification is attached to incorporated trading companies. The function of a proviso in a statute is dealt with in Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway Co., Ltd. v. Bezwada Municipality1. The wording of the Ballot Act-Article 582 of Vol. 12 of Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Ed.)-is different from our enactment.
 
The benefit in the present case is an indirect one. It is a benefit de facto resulting from the contracts. Certain English decisions on similar enactments are helpful-Todd v. Robinson 2 ; Dimes v. Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal 3 ; City of London Electricity Lighting Co., Ltd. v. London Corporation 4 ; Lapish v. Braithwaite 5. The benefit contemplated in section 13 (3) (c) is not limited to pecuniary benefit. It must be understood in its widest sense-England v. Inglis 6. One has to look to the object to be attained. The object obviously was to prevent the conflict between interest and duty that might otherwise inevitably arise-Hutton v. Wilson 7 ; Barnacle v. Clark 8 ; In re Pollard"s Settlement 9.
 
Whereas in Article 9 (d) of the repealed Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council of 1931, there was a proviso exempting a shareholder of an incorporated company, there is no such proviso in section 13 (3) (c) of the Order in Council of 1946.
 
H. V. Perera, K.C., with C. S. Barr Kumarakulasinghe, Vernon Wijetunge, and T. W. Rajaratnam, for the respondent.-The mere fact that there is no proviso exempting companies in the new enactment as in the old State Council Order in Council cannot be brought out to show
 
Foot Notes:

1 (1943) 28 C. L. W. 65.
2 (1884-5) 14 Q.B.D.739.
3 (1852) 2 H. L. C. . 759
4  (1901) 1 Ch L. 602; (1903) A. C. 434 at 442,
5 (1925) 1 K. B. 474 at 484.
6 (1920) 2 K. B. 636
7 (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 744 at 748
8 (1900) 1 Q. B. D. 279 at 283.
9 (1896) 2 Ch. D. 552.

that the omission was made with the intention of catching up all company shareholders. The company in question was a limited liability company and had a separate legal personality, and, as such, the benefits derived by it are not the benefits of the shareholder unless it is shown that the company was acting as the agent or secret nominee of the respondent, as in the case of Saravanamuttu v. de Mel 1.
 
In section 13 (3) (c) of the (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, the words " directly " or " indirectly " being adverbs must be taken to qualify the " holding or enjoying " the benefit. There is a difference between a person indirectly enjoying a benefit under a contract and a person enjoying an indirect benefit under a contract. In the latter case