KING v. DHARMASENA
NLR50V505
[Court
of Criminal Appeal]
1949 Present : Canekeratne J.
(President), Dias and Windham JJ.
THE KING v.
DHARMASENA et al.
Appeals 10-11
of 1949
S. C. 1-M. C. Colombo 36,089
Court
of Criminal Appeal-Charge of murder-Cross-examination
by Judge- Hostility to accused-Presumption of innocence-Jury
might disregard-" Any other ground "-Ordinance 23 of
1938-Section 5 (1).
Where a Judge takes on himself the burden
of cross-examination of the accused and conducts it in a manner hostile to the
accused there is a miscarriage of justice if such cross-examination may be
reasonably considered to have brought about the verdict of " Guilty "
where on the whole facts and without this attitude on the part of the Judge the
Jury might fairly and reasonably have found the appellant " Not guilty
".
An act of this kind on the part of a Judge comes within the
words-" any other ground " in section 5 (1) of Ordinance 23 of 1938
and the-Court of Criminal Appeal can grant a re-trial.
APPEALS from two convictions
in a trial before a Judge and Jury.
S. B. Lekamge, for 1st
accused appellant.
A. B. Perera, for 2nd accused appellant.
H. A. Wijemanne, Crown Counsel, with J. A. P. Cherubim, Crown Counsel, for the
Crown.
March 26, 1949. Canekeratne
J.-
The two appellants were convicted of the murder of
Govipolagodage Dionysius de Silva Seneviratne, and were sentenced to death, the
first appellant being convicted on count one of the indictment, an offence
punishable under section 113b read
with sections 296 and 102 of the Penal Code, and on count two, an offence
punishable under section 296 of the Penal Code. The second appellant was also
convicted on count one. She was also charged with having abetted the first
accused in the commission of the offence set out in count two but the Jury did not
consider that count, as the learned Judge told the Jury that if they were left
in a state of honest doubt as regards the charge of conspiracy then both counts
one and three fall. On March 16, 1949, this Court dismissed the appeal of the
first appellant and quashed the conviction of the second appellant and ordered
a new trial, and we now proceed to give our reasons for so doing.
According to the evidence, the first appellant who
lives at Nugegoda came to the house of the deceased, 107, College Street, Kotahena,
about 8.45 in the morning at a time when the servant woman, Alice Nona, was the
only inmate in the deceased's premises and having sent the servant woman away
or just after she left the place awaited the arrival of the deceased and
proceeded to kill him. Apparently just after this he ran to the adjoining
house, threatened the servant woman there, dropped the knife he had and also
his sarong with which he had covered his head and ran outside. He had left his
umbrella at 107, College
Street; one
Khalid saw this accused drop his coat which was found to be stained with human
blood, and a purse a little further away and then depart.
The first and main contention of counsel for the first accused was
that the method adopted by the learned Judge of refreshing the memory of the
witness Alice Nona by rea