Lanka Estates Agency, Ltd. V. Corea

1951 Present: Gratiaen J.

LANKA ESTATES AGENCY, LTD., Appellant, and COREA,

Respondent

S. C. 27- C. R. Kalutara, 712

Rent Restriction Act, No. 29 of 1948-Retrospective operation-Interpretation Ordinance s. 6 (3)-Recognized agent-" General power of attorney "-Distinction between-general agent and special agent-Civil Procedure Code, 25 (b) (c).

Where, during the pendency of an action for ejectment, the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act were, by proclamation, declared to be applicable to the locality in which the premises in question were situated-

Held, that the coming into operation of the Rent Restriction Act after an. action for ejectment has already commenced does not affect the landlord's accrued right to claim ejectment under the common law which governs the relationship of landlord and tenant.

Held further, that an agent with a special authority to represent his principal in matters in connection with a particular trade or business is a recognized-agent within the meaning of section 25 (b) of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 25 (b) was not intended to refer only to persons who hold general powers of attorney authorising them to represent the principal in every conceivable kind of transaction and in connection with every kind of legal proceeding.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of requests, Kalutara.

 H. V. Perera, K.C., with S. Walpita, for the plaintiff appellant.

E. B. Wikramanayake, K.C., with E. 8. Amerasinghe, for the defendant respondent.

Cur. adv. vult.

June 22, 1951. GRATIAEN J.-

This action was instituted on 24th March, 1949, by the landlord of a bungalow in the Kalutara District to have his tenant ejected from the premises. Admittedly the tenant had been given due notice to quit and the provisions of the Bent Restriction Act, No. 29 of 1948, did not, at the time when the action commenced, apply to the premises.

The tenant in his pleadings raised certain technical defences to which I shall later refer. The case was fixed for trial on 22nd August, 1949, but was postponed for 1st November, 1949, on the ground of the defendant's ill-health. On that date the case was again postponed for the same reason. The trial eventually took place and was concluded on 21st December, 1949.

In the meantime the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act, 1948, were, by proclamation, declared to be applicable, with effect from 2nd December, 1949, to the locality in which the premises were situated. Belying on this circumstance, the defendant's proctor raised an additional issue at the trial contesting the jurisdiction of the court to grant.

a decree in favour of the landlord except upon proof of one or other of the conditions specified in section 13 of the Act. This contention was upheld by the learned Commissioner of Requests.

It is apparent that there were no statutory fetters on the landlord's common law right to sue his tenant for ejectment when the action was instituted. The question, however, arose whether the subsequent proclamation of 2nd December, 1949, could legitimately be regarded as now restricting the accrued rights of the landlord in the pending action. The learned Commissioner answered the question in favour of the tenant on the authority of Banda v. Karohamy 1[(1948) 50 N. L. R. 369.]. With great respect, I do not see what application that decision, which was concerned with a plea of res adjudicata, can possibly have on the present issue.

The general principles upon which a court must determine whether intervening legislation can be regarded as having retrospective effect so as to interfere with rights in a pending action are clear enough. In Hitchcock v. Way 2[6 Ad. and EI. 943( = 112 E. R. 360).] Lord Denham declared that " in general the law as it existed when an action was commenced must decide the rights of the parties in the suit unless the Legislature express a clear intention to vary the relation of l

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