DAVID v. MENDIS et al
NLR53V337
1952 Present: Rose C.J.,
Gratiaen J. and Choksy A.J.
DAVID, Appellant, and MENDIS et al., Respondents
S. C. 339-D. C. Tangalla, 5,691
Registration of Documents
Ordinance (Cap. 101)-Sections 17 and 18, as amended by Ordinance No. 13 of
1947-Scope of-Bill of Sale-Meaning of term.
In a contract of sale of movable property, a written acknowledgment given by the
seller to the purchaser after title to the goods had already passed to the
purchaser on payment of the price and delivery of the goods is not a " bill of
sale " within the meaning of section 17 of the Registration of Documents
Ordinance. A bill of sale is necessary only where possession of the goods
intended to be sold is not given and the object is to pass the property in the
goods without possession of them being given.
Sections 17 and 18 of the Registration of Documents Ordinance do not apply to
verbal contracts of purchase and sale.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the District Court, Tangalla. This case was reserved for the
decision of a Bench of three Judges under section 38 of the Courts Ordinance.
N. E. Weerasooria, K.C., with H. W. Jayewardene and W. D. Gunasekera, for the
plaintiff appellant.-The document 2D6 is a " bill of sale " and comes within the
provisions of the Registration of Documents Ordinance (Cap. 101). This is a
transfer of movable property. There must he either delivery or registration. An
unregistered bill of sale is not sufficient. On the facts of this case
ostensible possession was with the first defendant. Therefore 2D6 was void as
against the plaintiff.
H. W. Jayewardene continued.-In the present case 2D6 was put forward as the
document intended to pass title. It is therefore a bill of sale which has not
been registered-French v. Gething1[(1922) K. B. 236]. Even apart from 2D6 the
transaction itself was void for non-compliance with the provisions of the
Registration of Documents Ordinance. The definition of " bill of sale " included
transactions that were not in writing. The earlier cases took this view. See
section 18 (b) and Indian Bank v. Chartered Bank2[(1941) 43 N. L. R. 49.];
Appuhamy v. Appuhamy3[(1932) 35 N. L. R. 329.]; Mohamad v. Eastern Bank 4[(1931)
33 N. L. R. 73.].
H. V. Perera, K.C., with Christie Seneviratne, for the second defendant
respondent.-What was sold was the business. 2D6 is only evidence of a
transaction and of the fact that the articles were handed over. It is not a
document which creates rights. Therefore it is not a " bill of sale ". The
Registration of Documents Ordinance (Cap. 101) as amended by Ordinance No.13 of
1947 deals only with documents. Inventories and
receipts are not bills of sale
unless they are given as an " assurance "- Haydon v. Brown 1[(1888) 59 L. T. (N.
S.) 810 at p. 811.]. With regard to the meaning of " ostensible possession ",
see French v. Gething2[ (1922) 1 K. B. 236 at p. 247].
G. C. Niks, for the first defendant respondent.
N. E. Weerasooria, K.C., in reply.-The document, 2D6, is something more than a
receipt. It is a document of sale. One must consider the transaction and not the
mere form of the document. See Ramsay v. Mar-grett3[(1894) 2Q. B. 18.] and
Charlesworth v. Mills 4[ (1892) A. C. 231.].
Cur. adv. vult.
January 16, 1952. GRATIAEN J.-
This appeal was reserved for the decision of a Bench of three Judges under
Section 38 of the Courts Ordinance.
On July 21, 1947, the plaintiff obtained a decree against the first defendant
for the payment of a sum of Rs. 4,000 and interest due to him on a promissory
note dated March 6, 1946. In execution of this decree the plaintiff caused
certain furniture and fittings lying at Galiton Hotel in Hambantota to be seized
by the Fiscal on July 22 and 23, 1947. The second defendant, however, claimed
the goods as his property, and his claim was upheld. The plaintiff thereupon
instituted the present action under Section 247 of the Civil Procedure Code to
have the property dec