CALDERA v. IMBULDENIYA
NLR54V229
1952 Present : Swan J.
CALDERA, Appellant, and IMBULDENIYA (S. I. Police),
Respondent
S. C. 1,131-M. C. Colombo, 18,314
Criminal intimidation-Threat
to cause death or grievous hurt-Jurisdiction of Magistrate's Court-Penal Code,
ss. 483, 486.
A Magistrate's Court has jurisdiction to try a case of criminal intimidation
if the threat was to cause death but the accused was unarmed and not in a
position to cause death or grievous hurt and the threat could not have been
uttered with any other intent than to cause alarm.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Magistrate's
Court, Colombo.
M. M. Kumarakulasingham, with J. C. Thurairatnam, for the accused
appellant.
Cecil Goonewardene, Crown Counsel, for the Attorney-General.
Cur. adv. vult.
March 21, 1952. SWAN J.-
The accused-appellant was charged in this case with criminal trespass and
intimidation under Sections 434 and 486 of the Penal Code. He was found guilty
on both counts and sentenced to one month's rigorous imprisonment on the first
count and to four months' rigorous imprisonment on the second count, the
sentences to run concurrently.
The only point taken by learned Counsel for the appellant was that the
Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the charge of intimidation inasmuch as the
threat was to kill the husband of the woman who was intimidated. I shall quote
the exact wording of the second charge :-
" 2. At the same time and place aforesaid the above-named accused did commit
criminal intimidation to J. Carline Perera of Hokandara North by threatening to
kill her husband with intent to alarm, and thereby committed an offence
punishable under Section 486 (Chapter 15). "
The point taken is by no means new. It was raised, as far as I can gather,
before Grenier J. in the case of Simeon Appuhamy v. Velun Singho 1[(1911)
5 S. C. D. 56.]. Said His Lordship :-
" In the schedule to the Criminal Procedure Code, I find that the District Court
and not the Police Court has jurisdiction to try a case
of intimidation if the threat be
to cause death or grievous hurt. In the present case the threat was clearly to
cause death and the Police Court had therefore no jurisdiction. "
Grenier J. quashed the conviction and sent the case back " for proceedings to be
taken according to law".
It should be noted that the threat to kill was made to the complainant Simeon
Appuhamy.
The next reported case involving the same point is Peter Gunaratne v. Allis
Sinno 1[(1913) 1 Cr. A. R. 16.], where de Sampayo J. held that a
threat to shoot which proceeds from a person who is not armed with a gun does
not amount to a threat to cause death or grievous hurt within the meaning of
Section 486.
In the course of his judgment Sampayo J. remarked :-
"It is argued on this evidence that this is a threat to cause death or grievous
hurt to the complainant within the meaning of the latter portion of Section 486,
but the circumstances do not seem to indicate that the threat was of that
description. The accused, as a matter of fact, had no gun or weapon in his hand,
but his attitude would seem to have caused alarm to the complainant and made him
believe that accused was determined to do some sort of bodily injury to him but
not necessarily kill him or cause grievous hurt; and after all the gist of the
offence is threatening another with injury to his person with intent to cause
alarm. The element necessary in this connection was supplied by the evidence and
there is no necessity to emphasise the fact that the words used by the accused
were that he would shoot. On the whole I think the case has been sufficiently
dealt with, and I am unable to interfere with the conviction either upon its
merits or upon the objection taken.
I dismiss the appeal. "
We now come to the case of Fernando v. de Vas 2[(1928) 9 C. L. Rec.
67.], where the objection taken was double-barrelled, so to say. It was
contended that if the threat to kill was serious the Polic