Karuppannan, A. V. Commissioner For Registration Of Indian And Pakistani Residents

1953 Present : Gratiaen J. and Gunasekara J.

A. KARUPPANNAN et al., Appellants, and COMMISSIONER
FOR REGISTRATION OF INDIAN AND PAKISTANI
RESIDENTS, Respondent

S. C. 371 and 1,003-Indian and Pakistani Residents'
Applications for Registration, Nos. C 816 and N 68

Costs-Supreme Court-Inherent jurisdiction to award costs-Courts Ordinance (Cap. 6),s. 19 (b)-Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, No. 3 of 1949, a. 15.

Subject to such statutory limitations as may be proscribed in particular instances, the Supreme Court possesses inherent power to award costs when exercising either its original or appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, when disposing of appeals filed under section 15 of the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, the Supreme Court is not precluded from making an appropriate order as to costs.

APPEALS under section 15 of the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act. They wore reserved under section 48 of the Courts Ordinance for the decision of a Bench of two Judges in regard to a question of costs.

N. K. Choksy, Q.C., with C. Shanmuganayagam, H. Rodrigo and Miss J. Somasunderam, for the appellants.

M. Tiruchelvam, Crown Counsel, with V. Tennekoon and J. W. Subasinghe, Crown Counsel, for the respondent.

Cur. adv. vult.

May 15, 1953. The Court pronounced the following order :-

These appeals came up before us, upon a reference by Swan J., for a decision as to whether the Supreme Court, when exercising its appellate jurisdiction under section 15 of the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, No. 3 of 1949, has power to award costs.

Section 19 (b) of the Courts Ordinance vests the Supreme Court with an appellate jurisdiction which is limited to the correction of errors made by the " original Courts ", that is to say, District Courts, Courts of Requests and Magistrates' Courts. This jurisdiction has been enlarged from time to time by later legislation, of which the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act, No. 3 of 1949, is an example. Many of these enactments, including the particular Act under consideration, do not expressly authorise the Court to award costs.

Apart from its criminal jurisdiction conferred by section 19 (a) of the Courts Ordinance, the Supreme Court possesses an original jurisdiction in certain other respects-for example, it is empowered to grant injunctions under section 20, to issue writs in the nature of mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, procedendo and prohibition, and to order the transfer of judicial proceedings from one Court to another (section 42). In none of these cases has the Supreme Court been granted express authority by the legislature to make appropriate orders as to costs, except to the limited extent whereby it is empowered to impose terms and conditions as to payment of costs when it makes an order for the transfer of proceedings.

Notwithstanding the absence of express statutory provision, the power of the Supreme Court to award costs when exercising either its original jurisdiction or its appellate jurisdiction (under the Courts Ordinance and also under later legislative enactments) has always been assumed ; indeed it has never been challenged until the present appeals came up for argument. We conceive, therefore, that the uninterrupted exercise of this power cannot logically be explained except on the basis that the Supreme Court possesses an inherent jurisdiction in respect of costs subject to such statutory limitations as may be prescribed in particular instances.

Mr. Tiruchelvam reminds us, and we agree, that the Supreme Court is a creature of statute, and that its jurisdiction in respect of any form of legal proceedings requires a statutory origin. But we do not subscribe to the suggested corollary that the Supreme Court cannot possess jurisdiction, independent of statute, to award costs in a

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