1954 Present: Gratiaen J. and Fernando A. J.

G. C. G. BARRETT, Appellant, and MRS. A. F. ALTENDORFF,
Respondent

S. C. 447-D. C. Colombo, 21,370

Delict-Inducement of breach of contract-Ingredients of the wrong.

A. sued B. in delict alleging that B. had induced A.'s employer C. to break A.'s contract of service with C. C. was an incorporated Company and B. was the Manager of the Ceylon Branch of that Company. It was established that B. acted within the scope of his authority as agent of C. when he terminated A.'s services.

Held, that, even if C. had unlawfully terminated the contract, B. was not personally liable for any damage resulting to A.

APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court, Colombo.

H. V. Perera, Q.C., with S. J. Kadirgamar and B. S. C. Ratwatte, for the defendant appellant.

N. E. Weerasooria, Q.C., with J. A. L. Cooray, for the plaintiff respondent.

Cur. adv. vult.

June 2, 1954. GRATIAEN J.-

The appellant was the Manager of the Ceylon Branch of the Dunlop Rubber Company Ltd. (hereinafter called " the Company"). The respondent had originally been employed in the Colombo office as a member of the Company's temporary staff, but on 31st March 1949 she was confirmed in her appointment as a stenographer. The terms of her employment provided, inter alia, that she should receive a monthly salary of Rs. 200 and that the contract could be terminated by either party giving one month's notice to that effect. (P1.)

On 27th May, 1949, according to her evidence, she was reprimanded for arriving late in the office. On the next day, having previously drawn her pay for the current month, she received a letter from the appellant stating that her services would no longer be required by the Company, but that she could immediately draw her " basic salary " for June (P2). This sum was in fact paid to her by cheque on 30th May, 1949, and a few days later she received (and accepted) a further sum of Rs. 107 representing " dearness allowance " for the month of June. There is no evidence as to how or when the amount of this allowance fell to be computed for each ensuing month, or as to whether she was entitled to it as of right as part of her remuneration. Indeed, no issue was framed covering these points. My reason for referring to this circumstance will become clear at a later stage of my judgment.

On 29th June 1949, the respondent sued the appellant in delict for the recovery of Rs. 2,500 as damages from him personally, the cause of action alleged being that he had " by wrongful and unlawful means maliciously and with intent to injure her caused the Company to terminate the contract of employment with her without just cause ". She preferred no claim against the Company itself for breach of contract, and no such remedy was available to her. The contract had been duly terminated by one month's notice, and the Company's outstanding contractual obligation to pay her the stipulated remuneration (even if it included " dearness allowance ") for the month of June had been discharged before the date on which she could strictly have claimed it. (Her corresponding obligation to perform any services during that month had, of course, been waived by the letter P2.)

In Quinn v. Leatham [1 (1901) A. C. 495, ], Lord Macnaghten, explaining Lumley v. Gye [2 (1863) 2 E. and B . 216.], said, " It is a violation of legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognised by law, if there be no justification for the interference ". In a more recent authoritative pronouncement, Lord Simon said that, apart from the effects of combination (or conspiracy) to injure a man in his trade,

" If C has an existing contract with A, and B is aware of it, and if B persuades or induces C to break the contract, with resulting damage to A, this is, generally speaking, a tortious act for which B will be liable to A for the injury he has done him. In some cases, however, B may be able