Back
PODINONA PERERA v. HANIFFA
NLR56V165
1953 Present: Swan J,
PODINONA PERERA, Appellant, and HANIFFA (Inspector),
Respondent
S. C. 860-M. C. Kegalle, 37,335
Brothels Ordinance-Charge of "
Keeping or managing a brothel "-Quantum of evidence -Sentence.
If a person keeps in a place even one solitary prostitute to be supplied to all
comers, that person may be convicted of " keeping or managing a brothel ".
Where a Magistrate chooses to impose a sentence of imprisonment rather than a
fine for a first offence under the Brothels Ordinance, he must give reasons for
so doing, or at least the proceedings must show that he has exercised his
discretion properly.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Magistrate's Court, Kegalle.
C. R. Gunaratne, for the accused appellant.
A. Mahendrarajah, Crown Counsel, for the Attorney-General.
Cur. adv. vult.
January 30, 1953. SWAN J.-
The appellant was charged with having on 20. 3. 1952 kept or managed a brothel.
She was convicted and sentenced to undergo a term of two months rigorous
imprisonment. Mr. C. R. Gunaratne appearing for her contends that the evidence
falls far short of establishing the charge of "keeping or managing a brothel
".At the time of the raid there was only one woman in the house besides the
accused. It is, he submits, an isolated case of prostitution.
The word brothel is not defined in the Ordinance. The definition given to it in
Singleton v. Ellison [1 (1895) L. R. 1 Q. B. 607.] was adopted by Withers J. in
Pieris v. Magrida Fernando [2 (1895) 1 N. L. R. 212] and followed by de Sampayo
J. in Morris v. Cornells [3 3 Bal. Notes 48.] and Wickremasuriya v. Mary Nona [
4 (1922) 24 N. L. R. 26.]. In these cases a brothel is defined as a place to
which men resorted for purposes of prostitution with women. In the last
mentioned case de Sampayo J. held that the occupation of a house or room by a
single prostitute did not constitute it a brothel. But that does not mean that
if a person keeps a single prostitute in a place to be supplied to all comers
that person cannot be said to keep or manage a brothel.
In Eliyatamby v. Wijelath Nona [1
(1934) 36 N. L. R. 300.] Akbar J. held that a single act of prostitution was
insufficient to render a place a brothel. But in Toussaint v. Cecilia [2 (1935)
37 N. L. R. 308.] Soertsz A.J. in a very interesting judgment went into the
derivation of the word " brothel " and gave it the following definition:
" A brothel is a house of ill-fame to which men resort for purposes of
prostitution with women who are to be found in the place or with women who
resort to or are introduced to the house. "
With this definition I am in complete agreement, but I do not think it excludes
such a case as I have referred to above, namely, a case where a single
prostitute is kept to be supplied to all comers.
Referring to the proposition that a solitary instance of prostitution is
insufficient to render a house a brothel Soertsz A.J. remarked:-
" Generally a solitary instance of prostitution in a house no more makes that
house a brothel than one swallow can make a summer.''
And he referred to a passage in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary which says " the
one proved instance may prove itself not a solitary but one of many instances ".
In the present case John Singho who was both informant and decoy says that when
he went to the accused's house it was the accused who opened negotiations and
asked him whether he wanted a " badua " and when he answered this cryptic
question in the affirmative, demanded Rs. 5 for the " badua ", took him inside a
room where later a woman was brought to him. There is also his evidence that
about a year earlier he took a gentleman to the same house and procured a woman
for him. This by itself constitutes no offence, but gives an indication of what
went on in the house. In my opinion the learned Magistrate was justified on the
material before him in holding that the charge was proved.
I see no reason to interfere
