PETER FERNANDO v. ABEYSINGHE
NLR57V262
1955 Present : Weerasooriya, J.
PETER FERNANDO, Appellant, and ABEYSINGHE (S. I. M.
Police), Respondent
S. C. 1,158-M. C. Panadura, 39,972
Interpretation Ordinance (Cap. 2)-Section 6 (3) (b)-Offence falling under
repealed statute-Charge in respect of it under repealing statute-Legality-Motor
Car Ordinance, No. 45 of 1938--Motor Traffic Act, No. 14 of 1951, ss. 2 (1), 14
(1), 244.
When a penal statute is superseded by another statute a person cannot be
prosecuted under the repealing statute for an offence which was committed when
the repealed statute was in force. It is, however, open to the prosecution, by
virtue of section 6 (3) (6) of the Interpretation Ordinance, to charge the
offender under the relevant provisions of the earlier statute notwithstanding
its subsequent repeal.
Section 244 of the Motor Traffic Act, No. 14 of 1951, does not enable a
prosecution under that Act for failure to register a car in breach of the
repealed Motor Car Ordinance, No. 45 of 1938.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Magistrate's Court, Panadura.
S. Ponniah, with C. Chellappah, for the accused appellant.
Shiva Pasupati, Crown
Counsel, for the Attorney-General.
November 24, 1955. WEERASOORIYA, J.-
The appellant was charged with the following offence, that on or about the 1st
day of October, 1950, he possessed a motor car No. Z 7960 and failed to register
the same in his name in breach of Section 2(1) read with Section 14 (1) of the
Motor Traffic Act No. 14 of 1951 and that he thereby committed an offence
punishable under Section 226 of that Act. The initial difficulty in the way of
the prosecution was to prove that the appellant committed an offence under the
Act, which came into operation only in 1951, in respect of an act done in 1950.
The evidence discloses that on the 1st October, 1950, possession of this car was
transferred by way of sale to the appellant, who, thereafter, continued to be
the person entitled to the possession of it, but he took no action to have
himself registered as the owner thereof. In respect of his possession of the car
on or about the 1st of October, 1950, without that car having been registered in
his name, he would have committed an offence under the repealed Motor Car
Ordinance No. 45 of 1938 and it was open to the prosecution to have charged him
under the relevant provisions of that Ordinance notwithstanding its subsequent
repeal. This is made clear by Section 6 (3) (b) of the Interpretation Ordinance.
The learned Magistrate, however, seems to have taken the view that Section 244
of the Motor Traffic Act No. 14 of 1951 enables the prosecution of the appellant
as for an offence committed under that Act in respect of his possession of the
car in 1950. I cannot see anything in Section 244 which warrants this view. The
conviction and sentence are set aside
and the accused is acquitted.
Appeal allowed.