REGINA v. SOMAPALA et al.
NLR57V350
[IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL]
1956 Present : Basnayake, A.C.J. (President), Gratiaen, J., and
Fernando, J.
REGINA v. P. M. SOMAPALA et al.
APPEALS 66-68, WITH APPLICATIONS 106-108, OF 1955
S. C. 28-M. C. Walasmulla, 12,723
Mens rea-Joint indictment-Several accused-Common intention--Guilty knowledge-
Misdirection-Penal Code, ss. 32, 146, 294, 317.
By Section 32 of the Penal Code -
" When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common
intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner
as if it were done by him alone. "
Held (by the majority of the Court), that the Section has only a limited scope
in relation to offences in which guilty knowledge is an element. It does not
constructively impute to one socius criminis the guilty knowledge of another. In
order to decide whether an accused person, to whom liability is imputed for
another person's criminal acts, has committed an offence involving guilty
knowledge, the test is whether such guilty knowledge has been established
against him individually by the evidence.
APPEALS, with applications for leave to appeal, against certain convictions in a
trial before the Supreme Court.
Calvin R. de Silva, with M. L. de Silva, T. Velupillai and S. M. H. de Silva,
for the accused-appellants.
V. S. A. Pullenayegum, Crown Counsel, for the Attorney-General.
Cur. adv. vult.
351
February 13, 1956. GRATIAEN, J.-
There were three appellants in this case, the second and third being
brothers-in-law of the first. They were jointly indicted for the murder of V. P.
Sirisena who died at the Civil Hospital, Galle, on August 13th, 1954, in
consequence of injuries inflicted on him two days previously in the 2nd
appellant's house in Kirama. The appellants were acquitted of murder, but the
jury unanimously found each of them guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder.
The appeal of the 1st appellant was not pressed before us and his conviction was
accordingly affirmed. At the conclusion of the argument, however, the Court
quashed the convictions of the other appellants for culpable homicide not
amounting to murder and substituted in each case a conviction for grievous hurt
punishable under S. 317 of the Penal Code.
The case for the Crown was largely based on certain statements (admissible under
S. 32 of the Evidence Ordinance) which the deceased person had made to reliable
witnesses as to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his
death. Has version was corroborated in part by the witness Charles who was
present during the earlier stages of the incident. It is safe to assume that the
jury was perfectly satisfied that, when the deceased and Charles were passing
the 2nd appellant's house at about 8.30 p.m. on the night in question, all three
appellants waylaid the deceased and dragged him forcibly into the house. Charles
escaped, and was unable to say what took place thereafter behind the closed
doors of the 2nd appellant's house, but, according to the dying declaration
previously mentioned, all the appellants assaulted the deceased very severely
with hands and with clubs.
The motive suggested for this high-handed conduct was that enmity had arisen
between the parties owing to friction engendered during a recent election
campaign ; there had also been bad feeling in connection with a trivial incident
which took place three weeks previously in a neighbour's boutique.
After the assault, the appellants ran away, leaving their victim behind in the
empty house. In the meantime Charles had spread the alarm in the locality and a
crowd of neighbours collected outside the house, but none of them had the
courage to enter it. At about 11.30 p.m. a Police Inspector who happened to be
passing in a jeep arranged for the injured man to be conveyed to Walasmulla for
medical attention. As surgical treatment was considered to be necessary, the man
was taken