SOOTHIRATNAM et al. v. ANNAMMA
NLR57V515
1954 Present : Gratiaen, J.,
and Gunasekara, J.
SOOTHIRATNAM (widow of V. Velupillai) et al., Appellants, and
ANNAMMA (widow of
Amirthalingam), Respondent
S. C. 403-D. C. Jaffna, 4,900/L
Abatement of action-Actio rei vindicatio-Transfer of subject-matter by plaintiff
pending action-Effect of abatement order on separate action instituted by
plaintiff's transferee-Civil Procedure Code, ss. 396 403, 404-Registration of
Documents Ordinance, s. 11 (1) and (3).
Section 403 of the Civil Procedure Code, which prohibits a fresh action being
brought when an action has abated, directly affects only those persons who,
while they are precluded from instituting separate proceedings on the same cause
of action, nevertheless enjoy the alternative remedy of having the order of
abatement vacated in order that the original action may be proceeded with.
A instituted against B an action for the recovery of certain property. The lis
pendens was not registered. During the pendency of the action, A transferred the
property in dispute to C. Subsequently A died, and, as his legal representatives
took no steps to continue the proceedings, an order of abatement was made by
Court under section 396 of the Civil Procedure Code. Before A's action had
abated, C had instituted the present action in his own right to have the same
defendant, B, ejected from the premises.
Held, that the provisions of section 403 of the Civil Procedure Code did not
prevent the maintenance of the present action.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the District Court, Jaffna.
G. Ranganathan, for the
plaintiffs appellants.
H. W. Tambiah, for the defendant respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
January 21, 1954. GRATIAEN, J.-
On 23rd March 1946 the appellant obtained from Velupillai Vinasithamby for
valuable consideration a notarial lease of the property in dispute for a period
of ten years commencing on 1st April 1946. He was unable to obtain vacant
possession of the leased premises, and on 8th October 1948 he filed this action
alleging that the defendant was a trespasser on the premises, and prayed inter
alia for a decree of ejectment against him. That such a remedy is prima facie
available to a lessee of immovable property by virtue of the pro tanto
alienation in his favour is not disputed.
The defendant denied that he was a trespasser, and claimed to be the owner of
the property by virtue of a title superior to that of the appellant's lessor
Vinasithamby. A number of issues were framed at the commencement of the trial,
but, after some evidence had been led, certain additional issues were raised
which, in the submission of the defendant's counsel, went to the root of the
action. The learned Judge agreed to adjudicate upon these additional issues in
the first instance, and after hearing argument upheld the defendant's plea that
the appellant was precluded from maintaining the action by reason of certain
admitted facts which I shall now proceed to examine.
It was established by the evidence that, before the execution of the lease in
favour of the appellant, his lessor Vinasithamby had himself instituted a rei
vindicatio action on 16th October 1944 against the defendant for the recovery of
the property in dispute. Before the trial was concluded, however, Vinasithamby
died, and, as his legal representatives took no steps thereafter to continue the
proceedings, an order of abatement was duly made by the trial Judge on 15th
October 1948 in terms of section 396 of the Civil Procedure Code. It will be
observed that, before the date of this order, the appellant had already
instituted the present action in his own right to have the defendant ejected
from the premises. Nevertheless, the learned Judge upheld the plea that the
subsequent order of abatement made in the action filed by Vinasithamby was
binding on the appellant and had the effect of precluding him from pursuing his
independent remedy against the defenda