1957     Present : L. W. de Silva, A.J.

WARLIS, Appellant, and SCOTT, Respondent

S. C. 1,380-M. C. Kurunegala, 25,448

Charge-Duplicity-Particulars of offence-Motor Traffic Act, No. 14 of 1951, s. 153 (2)-Criminal Procedure Code, s. 169.

A charge of driving recklessly or in a dangerous manner in breach of section 153 (2) of the Motor Traffic Act is not bad for duplicity or for want of particulars of the manner of the commission of the offence within the meaning of section 169 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Edwin Singho v. S. I., Police, Kadawatta (1956) 57 N. L. R. 355, distinguished.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Magistrate's Court, Kurunegala.

T. B. Dissanayake, for accused-appellant. A. C. de Zoysa, Crown Counsel, for the Attorney-General.

Cur. adv. vult.

July 19, 1957. L. W. de SILVA, A.J.-

The appellant was tried on two charges framed under the Motor Traffic Act No. 14 of 1951 and was convicted on the first charge which has alleged that he did on August 21,1956-

" Being the driver of bus No. IC 2405 drive the same on a public road to with along Alawwa-Narammala Road recklessly or in a dangerous manner in breach of section 153 (2) of the Motor Traffic Act No. 14 of 1951 and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 219 (1) "

of the said Act. Section 153 (2) is as follows :-

" No person shall drive a motor vehicle on a highway recklessly or in a dangerous manner or at a dangerous speed. "

The two points taken on the appellant's behalf are as follows : (1) the charge sets out two distinct offences in the alternative and is therefore bad for duplicity ; (2) the charge is bad in that it does not set out particulars of the manner in which the offence was committed. Learned counsel for the appellant, relying on the judgment in Edwin Singho v. S. I. Police, Kadawatta 1, contended that the appellant was entitled to an acquittal. Learned Crown Counsel contended that that case was wrongly decided.

In that case, two charges had been framed under sections 153 (2) and 153 (3) of the Motor Traffic Act. The first charge, which alone has a bearing on this appeal, alleged that the accused drove a motor bus " recklessly or in a dangerous manner or at a dangerous speed in breach of section 153 (2) ". It appears to have been assumed that the first charge was in respect of three different offences. The judgment makes it clear that no other point of view was put forward or considered, and Sansoni J. citing a number of local and English decisions held that the charges framed in the alternative were bad for duplicity. He set aside the conviction taking into account the important consideration that it would not be clear upon a conviction or an acquittal of what offence the accused had been found guilty or acquitted. He also held that the omission to set out the details of each offence in the charge as required by section 169 of the Criminal Procedure Code had occasioned a failure of justice.

The two English cases followed by Sansoni J. in Edwin Singho s case,[1 (1956) 57 N. L. R. 355. ] are B. v. Wilmot[2 24 Cr. App. R. 63.] and B. v. Surrey Justices, ex parte Witherick3. In Wilmot's case 2, the charge, after setting out the date and place, alleged that the accused

" Drove a motor car recklessly, or at a speed or in a manner which was dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition and use of the road and the amount of traffic which was actually at the time, or which might reasonably have been expected to be, on the said road. "

The count was an exact copy of section 11 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, and it is not surprising that the charge was held bad for duplicity. In Wiiherick's case [2 (1932) 1 K. B. 450.], the information charged the accused with driving a motor vehicle on a road " without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road c