[IN THE PRIVY COUNCIL]

1959 Present : Lord Reid, Lord Tucker, Lord Somervell of Harrow,
Lord .Denning and Mr. L. M. D. de Silva

C. V. UDALAGAMA, Appellant, and IRANGANIE BOANGE,
Respondent

Privy Council Appeal No. 14 of 1958

S. C. 444--D.C Kegalle, 7,813

    Breach of promise of marriage-Action for recovery of damage Promise in writing- Relevancy of oral promise to marry-.Marriage Registration Ordinance (Ca,. 95), s.19.

By section 19 of the Marriage Registration Ordinance-

". ...no action shall lie for the recovery of damages for breach of promise of marriage, unless such promise of marriage shall have been made in writing. "

Held, that documentary evidence which does not in express or other unequivocal terms contain promise to marry is insufficient to prove a promise in writing even though it may afford evidence of an oral promise to marry. The writing required to satisfy the Ordinance must contain an express promise to marry or confirm a previous oral promise to marry, i.e., admit the making of the promise and evince continuing willingness to be bound by it.

Jayasinghe. Perera (1903) 9 N. L. R. 62, overruled.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 57 N. L. R. 385.

Sir Frank Soakice, Q.C., with Ralph Miller , for the defendant-appellant,.

No appearance for the plaintiff-respondent.

Cur. adv. vult.

July 29, 1959. [Delivered by LORD TUCKER]-

In this case the respondent sued the appellant for damages for breach of promise of marriage. A good deal of oral evidence, conflicting on many points, and some documentary evidence was placed before the trial Judge who held that no written or oral promise to marry was established on the evidence before him. The greater part of the evidence related to the question whether there was an oral promise to marry. For reasons which appear later it will be seen that this evidence was immaterial to a decision of this case and should therefore have been excluded.

On appeal the Supreme Court held that under the earlier decisions of that Court an "action for damages lies if, in a letter addressed by the defendant to the plaintiff, there is confirmation or at least an unqualified admission of a subsisting and binding oral promise of marriage ". It held that the necessary elements existed and setting aside the order of the district Judge, entered judgment for the respondent. The question is whether this ruling was correct.

It is convenient at this stage to state what in their Lordships' opinion is the law of Ceylon relating to the matter. An action does not lie in Ceylon for every breach of a promise to marry. A restriction is imposed by section 19 of the Marriage Registration Ordinance (Chapter 95.- Legislative- Enactments of Ceylon, Vol. III, p: 122), which,. after making
certain provision which has no bearing on cases of breach of promise, enacts as its final provision

" .no action shall lie for the recovery of damages for breach of promise of marriage, unless such promise of marriage shall have been made in writing. "

"There is nothing further in the Ordinance or in any other Statute which has a bearing on the point.

Their Lordships are of opinion that the policy of the Legislature has i been to limit the cases in which an action can be brought to those in f which the promise itself is in writing. It may be contained in one or t more documents. Documentary evidence which does not in express or other unequivocal terms contain a promise to marry is insufficient even though it may afford evidence of an oral promise to marry.

Some confusion seems to have arisen in this case with regard to the meaning of such words as "evidenced in writing" and " confirmation ".The distinction which must always be borne in mind is between writing C which contains the promise to marry and writing which may afford corroboration of a previous oral promise. The latter, which is sometimes described as writing "which evidences