JOSEPH FERNANDO v. PEARLIN FERNANDO
NLR61V177
1957 Present:
Weerasooriya, J., and Sinnetamby, J.
s, Appellant, and PEARLIN FERNANDO,
Respondent
S. C. 233-D. C. Negombo, 16,654/L
Evidence-Proof of execution of a deed when attesting witness denies the
execution- Handwriting-Proof of its genuineness-Evidence Ordinance, ss. 68, 69,
71.
When an attesting witness, who is called for the purpose of proving the
execution of a document required by law to be attested, denies the execution of
the document, proof of his signature is not sufficient to establish due
execution. Under section 69, read with section 71, of the Evidence Ordinance
there must be, in addition, proof of the executant's signature.
Quaere, whether, in the absence of other evidence and without the benefit of the
opinion of an expert, it is open to a Court, on a mere comparison of two
documents containing respectively an admitted signature and a signature which is
repudiated, to express the opinion whether the two signatures are of one and the
same person.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the District Court,
Negombo.
Ivor Misso, with A. Nagendra, for the 2nd defendant- appellant.
E. R. S. R. Coomaraswamy, with E. B. Vannitamby and T. G. Gunasekera, for the
plaintiff-respondent.
Cur. adv. vult
February 15, 1957.
WEERASOORIYA, J.-
The substantial question which arises in this appeal is whether the learned
trial Judge was right in holding that decdNo.154 of 1933,which is one of the
deeds relied on by the plaintiff-respondent in proof of her title to the
entirety of the land in suit, and of which PI is a certified copy, had been duly
executed. Deed No. 154 is a deed by which the 1st defendant (who died while the
action was pending) and one of her children, Emailine, purported to sell the
land for a sum of Rs. 6,000 to one Matilda Pieris. Although the deed purports to
convey the entire land, actually the 1st defendant was entitled to only an
undivided three fourths share, and Emaline to an undivided one-sixteenth share,
at the time of its alleged execution.
The 2nd defendant, who is the appellant and a son of the 1st defendant, claims
to have acquired the undivided three-fourths share of the 1st defendant by
virtue of a subsequent deed, D4 of 1951, from the 1st defendant.
The 1st and 2nd defendants in the answer filed by them challenged deed No. 154
as a forgery, and certain of the issues on which the case went to trial related
to the questions whether the signature on it purporting to be that of the 1st
defendant was a forgery and whether it had been duly executed. Although the name
of the attesting notary was included in the list of witnesses filed by the
plaintiff, and summons issued on him, the plaintiff refrained from calling him
at the trial, on the ground, as stated by her counsel, that he was "not
available ". Prior to the trial, and shortly before her death, the 1st defendant
was examined on commission as a witness, and she denied having been a party to
any transaction as embodied in P1. Neither P1 nor the original deed or the
duplicate, nor the other certified copy, P1a, (all of which were subsequently
produced at the trial) was shown to her.
The names of the two attesting witnesses in P1 refer to the 2nd defendant and
one Leo Fernando (who is the husband of Emaline).
The question whether in the absence of the notary and in view of the evidence
given by the 1st defendant it was incumbent on the plaintiff to call one or
other of the attesting witnesses was discussed at the trial and counsel for the
plaintiff conceded the burden being on the plaintiff (as it undoubtedly was) to
call one of them. He ultimately decided to call the 2nd defendant who, however,
denied in his evidence that he signed the deed or was present at its execution.
In the course of his examination by counsel for the plaintiff he was shown what,
presumably, was the proxy granted by him for the purposes of this case and he
admitted that
the signat