[IN THE PRIVY COUNCIL]

1960

Present : Lord Tucker, Lord Keith of Avonholm, Lord Jenkins,
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Mr. L. M. D. de Silva

THE LAND COMMISSIONER, Appellant, and LADAMUTTU PILLA I
and another, Respondents

PRIVY COUNCIL APPEAL No. 39 OF 1959

S. C. 457-D. C. Colombo, 288/Z

    Land Redemption Ordinance, No. 61 of 1942-Interpretationand scope of 8ection 3Land Commis8ioner-Hisliability to be sued-Effect of words "determination 8hall be final "-Certiorari-Land Acquisition Act, No.9 of 1950-Civil Procedure code, 88. 463, 464-Land Development Ordinance of 1935,8.2. Sub-sections 1 and 4 of section 3 of the Land Redemption Ordinance, No. 61 of 1942, prior to amending Ordinance No. 62 of 1947, were in the following terms :

"3. (1) The Land Commissioner is hereby authorised to acquire on behalf of Government the whole or any part of any agricultural land, if the Land Commissioner is satisfied that that land was, at any time before or after the date appointed under section 1, but not earlier than the first day of January, 1929, either

(a) sold in execution of a mortgage decree, or

(b) transferred by the owner of the land to any other person in satisfaction or part satisfaction of a debt which was due from the owner to such other person and which was, immediately prior to such transfer, secured by a mortgage of the land.

(4) The question whether any land which 'the Land Commissioner is authorised to acquire under sub-section (1) should or should not be acquired shall, subject to any regulations made in that behalf, be determined by the Land Commissioner in the exercise of his individual judgment; and every such determination of the Land Commissioner shall be final ".

Held, (i) that the words" to any other person" must be interpreted as including any other person or persons. The circumstance that as between two transferees one took an undivided two-third share of the land transferred and the other an undivided one-third was not material.

(ii) that in considering the word" debt" as used in section  3 (1) (b) there is no reason to exclude a debt due under a mortgage decree founded upon a mortgage bond. Where a land is mortgaged and the mortgage is put in suit and decree is entered against the mortgagor for the payment of the amount due on the mortgage bond, a subsequent voluntary conveyance by the mortgagor in favour of the mortgagee, the consideration for which is set off in full settlement of the amount due on the decree, is a transfer as contemplated in section 3 (1) (b).

(iii) that land transferred to two persons in satisfaction of debts due to only one of them does not fall within the purview of section 3 (1) (b).

(iv) that section 3 (I) (b) is applicable even to a case where the lands transferred are some only of the lands secured by mortgage

(v) that the words" every such determination shall be final" in sub-section 4 of section 3 cannot prevent the courts of law from inquiring whether any particular land is land which the Land Commissioner is authorised to acquire under the provisions of sub-section 1.

(vi) that the Land Commissioner is not a Corporation Sole. If the authority of a Land Commissioner to make a determination under section 3 is challenged the appropriate procedure is by way of an application for certiorari.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1958) 59 N. L. R. 313.

E. F. N. Gratiaen, Q.C., with Walter Jayawardene, for the appellant (Land Commissioner).

Sir Frank Soskice, Q.C., with Joseph Dean, for the substituted plaintiff respondent.

Cur. adv. vult.

July 27, 1960. [Delivered by LORD MORRIS OF BORTH-Y-GEST]

This is an appeal from the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Ceylon dated the 31st January, 1958. The Supreme Court by a majority (Basnayake, C.J. and Pulle, J., K. D. de Silva, J. dissenting) allowed the appeal of the substituted plaintiff in the action from the Judgment and D