WIJESINGHE v. INCORPORATED COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION
NLR65V364
1963 Present :
Sansoni, J.
D. WIJESINGHE,
Appellant, and THE INCORPORATED
COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION, Respondent
S. C. 28 of 1961-C. R. Colombo, 73821/R. E.
(1) Action
instituted by a corporation-Plaint signed only by the proctor representing the
corporation-Sufficiency of such signature-Civil Procedure Code, ss. 24, 25, 46
(1), 470-Council of Legal Education Ordinance (Cap. 276).
When a Corporation is represented by a proctor, a plaint filed on behalf of the
Corporation would be sufficiently signed as required by section 470 of the Civil
Procedure Code if it is signed only by the proctor; the plaint need not be
subscribed by anyone else on behalf of the Corporation.
(2) Proctor's appearance for a party-Proxy-Presumption of validity and
regularity attaching to its execution-Proxy given by Council of Legal
Education-Should one of the attesting witnesses be called to prove due execution
?-Burden of proof-Courts Ordinance (Cap. 6), Second Schedule, Rule 4-Evidence
Ordinance, s. 68.
Once the Court accepts and acts on a proxy filed in favour of a proctor,
presumably because no defect appears on the face of the proxy, any party who
desires to question the authority of that proctor has the onus of showing the
want of authority. Accordingly, once the Court accepts and acts on a proxy given
to a proctor by the Incorporated Council of Legal Education, when it is
plaintiff in an action, the Court is entitled to assume, in the absence of
evidence led to the contrary by the defendant, that the common seal of the
Council was affixed to the proxy after due compliance with the requirements of
Rule 4 of the Second Schedule to the Courts Ordinance. In such a case it cannot
be contended that, under section 68 of the Evidence Ordinance, the plaintiff
must call at least one of the attesting witnesses to prove the execution of the
proxy.
3 ) Landlord and tenant-Premises let by Incorporated Council of Legal Education-
Notice to quit sent by Council's proctor-Validity-Acceptance by landlord' of
rent from overholding tenant-Effect-Acceptance of late payments of rent from
statutory tenant-Effect-Applicability of equitable principle of promissory"
estoppel-Rent Restriction Act, No. 29 of 1948, s. 13 (1) (a).
In an action instituted by the Incorporated Council of Legal Education to have a
tenant ejected from certain premises let on a monthly rent, the authority of the
Council's proctor for having given the tenant notice to quit need not be proved
if his authority to represent the Council in the action is, not questioned.
When a landlord accepts money sent to him as rent, from a tenant who overholds
after receiving a notice to quit, a new contractual tenancy is not thereby
created, unless it can be shown that the parties intended to and in fact created
a new tenancy. If, for example, in every receipt issued it was stated that the
payment was received " without prejudice to the notice to quit already given and
the cause of action already arisen ", it is clear that the payments of rent were
not accepted in respect of a new tenancy.
A monthly tenant (the defendant), before he became a statutory tenant, had been
paying rent once in two months. After he became a statutory tenant, he could
have lawfully relied on the tacit permission given by the landlord (the
plaintiff) to continue to pay in that way. He did pay in that way until June
1954. But, from July 1954 the delay in making payments became longer and longer
until there was gross and inexcusable delay just before the-present action was
filed for ejectment of the tenant in terms of section 13(1) (a) of the Rent
Restriction Act. Moreover, throughout the period of the statutory tenancy, the
late payments of rent were accepted by the landlord without prejudice, which
meant that they were not to affect the notice to quit.
Held, that the tenant had clearly failed to perform his obligatio