[IN THE PRIVY COUNCIL]

1964 Present: Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Pearce,
Lord Upjohn, and Lord Donovan

ABDUL AZEEZ and others, Appellants, and THE QUEEN,
Respondent

PRIVY Council , APPEAL NO. 15 OF-1964

S. C. 799-807J59-M. G. Balangoda, 69020

Criminal trespass-" Intent to annoy "-Quantum of evidence-Penal Code, ss. 427, 433.

Such annoyance as may be caused to an occupier of property by the commission of civil trespass upon that property is not sufficient to establish the offence of criminal trespass. To constitute the offence of criminal trespass, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt that the intent or object with which the trespass was committed was one of those specified in section 427 of the Penal Code.

The accused-appellants were convicted on three counts, in each of which the offence of criminal trespass was an essential ingredient. It was alleged by the prosecution that the criminal trespass was committed by the accused by entering into a certain tea estate with the intention of annoying the Superintendent who was in occupation of the estate and had refused them permission to enter. The defence was that the purpose of the appellants, who were trade union officials, in entering the estate Was to persuade certain labourers, who had been on strike on the estate, to give up their " sathyagraha". The Magistrate who heard the case did not believe that the purpose of the appellants in trespassing upon the estate was to get the strikers to abandon Sathyagraha. He found that, quite apart from the fact that there was direct evidence that the entry of the accused into the estate did cause annoyance to the Superintendent, it was quite clear that the natural consequence of the trespass was to cause annoyance to him.

Held, that the evidence in the case did not suffice to establish either directly or by inference beyond reasonable doubt that the object of trespassing on the estate was to annoy the Superintendent. While accepting the Magistrate's conclusion that the expressed intention to get the strikers to abandon Sathyagraha was merely a pretext for entry, this finding by the Magistrate did not exclude the possibility that the real object of the trade union officials in making the trespass Was to meet the strikers, as stated by a witness, and to discuss the Strike with them. Although a natural consequence of the trespass might have been to cause annoyance to the Superintendent, in the circumstances of the present case it was not established with the degree of certainty required to justify conviction, that the trespass was effected with intent to annoy the Superintendent.

Held further, that, although the intent of the accused has in most cases to be inferred from the circumstances of the case, the fact that the entry into the estate was in defiance of the Superintendent did not warrant the inference that the trespass was committed with intent to annoy him. If that was the case, then every trespass committed after the occupier of the property had refused permission to enter would constitute the offence of criminal trespass.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1963) 65 N. L. R. 553.

E. F. N. Gratiaen, Q.G., with John A. Baker and M. I. Hamavi Haniffa, for the accused-appellants.

Mark Littman, Q.G., with Mervyn Heald, for the respondent.

Cur. adv. vult.

December 8, 1964. [Delivered by VISCOUNT DILHORNE]-

The eight appellants were convicted on three counts in the Magistrate's Court at Balangoda on the 24th July 1959. Their appeal to the Supreme Court of Ceylon was dismissed on the 28th October 1963, and their appeal to the Judicial Committee was by special leave granted on the 26th March 1964.

The accused were charged as follows :-

" You are hereby charged, that you did, .... at Pettiagala Estate on the 4th February 1959,

1. Being members of an unlawful assembly the common object of which was t