(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 , 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus PULSIFER v. UNITED STATES CERTIORAI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT No. 22–340. Argued October 2, 2023—Decided March 15, 2024 After pleading guilty to distributing at least 50 grams of methampheta- mine, petitioner Mark Pulsifer faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. At sentencing, he sought to take advantage of the “safety valve” provision of federal sentencing law, which allows a sentencing court to disregard the statutory minimum if a defendant meets five criteria. Among those is the requirement, set out in Para- graph (f)(1), that the sentencing court find that— (1) the defendant does not have— (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines. The Government argued that Pulsifer could not satisfy that require- ment because he had two prior three-point offenses totaling six crimi- nal-history points. In the Government’s view, each of those prior of- fenses disqualified him under Subparagraph B and the six total points disqualified him under Subparagraph A. But Pulsifer claimed he remained eligible. He pointed out that his criminal record lacked a two-point violent offense, as specified in Subparagraph C. And in his view, only the combination of the items listed in the subpara- graphs could prevent him from getting safety-valve relief. The Dis- trict Court agreed with the Government, and the Eighth Circuit af- firmed. Held: A defendant facing a mandatory minimum sentence is eligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U. S. C. §3553 (f)(1) only if he satisfies each 2 PULSIFER v. UNITED STATES Syllabus of the provision’s three conditions—or said more specifically, only if he does not have more than four criminal-history points, does not have a prior three-point offense, and does not have a prior two-point violent offense. Pp. 6–28. (a) Each party offers a grammatically permissible way to read Par- agraph (f)(1). Under Pulsifer’s reading, the word “and” joins three fea- tures of a defendant’s criminal history into a single disqualifying char- acteristic; accordingly, a defendant is ineligible for the safety valve only if he has the items listed in Subparagraphs A, B, and C in combi- nation. In the Government’s view, “and” connects three criminal-his- tory conditions, all of which must be satisfied to gain safety-valve re- lief. In other words, the court must find the defendant does not have A, does not have B, and does not have C. Each of those readings is possible in the abstract. The choice between the two can sensibly be made only by examining the content of Paragraph(f)(1)’s three subpar- agraphs, including what they say, how they relate to each other, and how they fit with other pertinent law. Pp. 6–15. (b) The text and context of Paragraph (f)(1), as read against the Guidelines, yield just one plausible statutory construction. The para- graph creates an eligibility checklist, and specifies three necessary conditions for safety-valve relief. Reading the paragraph as Pulsifer does to set out a single condition—i.e., that the defendant not have the combination of the characteristics listed in Subparagraphs A, B, and C—would create two statutory difficulties that the Government’s read- ing does not. Pp. 15–23. (1) Pulsifer’s reading would render Subparagrap