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2022 Supreme(US)(ca10) 27

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
United States – Appellant
Versus
Casados – Respondent



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 18, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. Nos. 20-1006 & 20-1216

TWYLA CASADOS,

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 1:19-CR-00001-REB-JMC-1) _________________________________

David S. Norris of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Phoenix, Arizona (Keith Bradley of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Denver, Colorado, with him on the briefs), for Defendant-Appellant.

Paul Farley, Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado (Jason R. Dunn, United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff- Appellee. _________________________________

Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

MORITZ, Circuit Judge. _________________________________

The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A,

requires the district court to award restitution to reimburse a victim of an offense for

transportation expenses incurred to attend proceedings related to the offense. See Appellate Case: 20-1006 Document: 010110647198 Date Filed: 02/18/2022 Page: 2

§ 3663A(b)(4). The MVRA also permits a victim’s representative to “assume the

victim’s rights.” § 3663A(a)(2). But we conclude that § 3663A(a)(2) does not permit

the victim’s representative to substitute his or her own expenses for those of the

victim. Thus, the district court here lacked authority to order Twyla Casados to pay

restitution for transportation expenses that were incurred not by the victim of

Casados’s crime but instead by the victim’s representative. We therefore reverse and

remand for entry of a corrected restitution order.

Background

Casados, a member of the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, was driving under the

influence within the boundaries of the Southern Ute reservation in Colorado when

she struck and killed another motorist, Charlene Bailey. Casados pleaded guilty to

one count of second-degree murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111, and her plea

agreement specifically anticipated a restitution order and described Bailey as “the

victim” of the offense.1 R. vol. 1, 10.2

The presentence report prepared by the United States Probation Office

discussed two separate restitution requests. First, the Probation Office explained that

1 Although the government agreed that Casados’s conduct was comparable in culpability to a state-law vehicular-homicide crime, it ultimately charged her with second-degree murder because there was no applicable crime for vehicular homicide in Indian country. So Casados pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, and the parties agreed to recommend a lower sentencing range than is typical for second- degree murder and more aligned with the state-law penalty for vehicular homicide. 2 We cite to the record in Appeal No. 20-1006.

2 Appellate Case: 20-1006 Document: 010110647198 Date Filed: 02/18/2022 Page: 3

the La Plata County Crime Victim Compensation Board paid $1,854.00 for Bailey’s

cremation services and concluded that the Victim Compensation Board was entitled

to restitution for that payment. Second, the Probation Office described the

government’s restitution request for $

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