2022 Supreme(US)(ca10) 27
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
United States – Appellant
Versus
Casados – Respondent
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 18, 2022
Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. Nos. 20-1006 & 20-1216
TWYLA CASADOS,
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 1:19-CR-00001-REB-JMC-1) _________________________________
David S. Norris of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Phoenix, Arizona (Keith Bradley of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Denver, Colorado, with him on the briefs), for Defendant-Appellant.
Paul Farley, Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado (Jason R. Dunn, United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff- Appellee. _________________________________
Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
MORITZ, Circuit Judge. _________________________________
The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A,
requires the district court to award restitution to reimburse a victim of an offense for
transportation expenses incurred to attend proceedings related to the offense. See Appellate Case: 20-1006 Document: 010110647198 Date Filed: 02/18/2022 Page: 2
§ 3663A(b)(4). The MVRA also permits a victim’s representative to “assume the
victim’s rights.” § 3663A(a)(2). But we conclude that § 3663A(a)(2) does not permit
the victim’s representative to substitute his or her own expenses for those of the
victim. Thus, the district court here lacked authority to order Twyla Casados to pay
restitution for transportation expenses that were incurred not by the victim of
Casados’s crime but instead by the victim’s representative. We therefore reverse and
remand for entry of a corrected restitution order.
Background
Casados, a member of the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, was driving under the
influence within the boundaries of the Southern Ute reservation in Colorado when
she struck and killed another motorist, Charlene Bailey. Casados pleaded guilty to
one count of second-degree murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111, and her plea
agreement specifically anticipated a restitution order and described Bailey as “the
victim” of the offense.1 R. vol. 1, 10.2
The presentence report prepared by the United States Probation Office
discussed two separate restitution requests. First, the Probation Office explained that
1 Although the government agreed that Casados’s conduct was comparable in culpability to a state-law vehicular-homicide crime, it ultimately charged her with second-degree murder because there was no applicable crime for vehicular homicide in Indian country. So Casados pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, and the parties agreed to recommend a lower sentencing range than is typical for second- degree murder and more aligned with the state-law penalty for vehicular homicide. 2 We cite to the record in Appeal No. 20-1006.
2 Appellate Case: 20-1006 Document: 010110647198 Date Filed: 02/18/2022 Page: 3
the La Plata County Crime Victim Compensation Board paid $1,854.00 for Bailey’s
cremation services and concluded that the Victim Compensation Board was entitled
to restitution for that payment. Second, the Probation Office described the
government’s restitution request for $