2022 Supreme(US)(ca10) 109
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Estrada-Cardona – Appellant
Versus
Garland – Respondent
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS August 17, 2022
Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________
MAYRA VERONICA ESTRADA- CARDONA,
Petitioner,
v. No. 21-9562
MERRICK B. GARLAND, United States Attorney General,
Respondent. _________________________________
Petition for Review of an Order from the Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________________
Jennifer M. Smith of Jennifer Smith Law Office, Glenwood Spring, Colorado (Mark R. Barr of Lichter Immigration, Denver, Colorado, with her on the briefs), for Petitioner.
Keith McManus, Office of Immigration Litigation (Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; Jessica E. Burns, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation; Spencer S. Shucard, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, on the brief), United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. _________________________________
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. _________________________________ Appellate Case: 21-9562 Document: 010110725741 Date Filed: 08/17/2022 Page: 2
The Attorney General may allow otherwise-removable aliens to remain in the
country if, among other things, they have accrued 10 years of continuous physical
presence in the United States. We call this form of discretionary relief “cancellation
of removal.” Under the statutory “stop-time rule,” the period of continuous physical
presence ends (A) when the alien is served with a notice to appear, or (B) when the
alien has committed certain criminal offenses. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). Nothing more,
nothing less. In the latest installment of “What Triggers the Stop-Time Rule?” the
Government asks us to hold that the issuance of a final order of removal is a third,
extra-statutory event sufficient to stop the clock. The plain language of the statute
supports no such conclusion. Declining to read ambiguity into a statute where none
exists, we hold a final order of removal does not stop the accrual of continuous physical
presence.
I.
In 2002, Petitioner Mayra V. Estrada-Cardona entered the United States on a
tourist visa which she subsequently overstayed. She resided in the United States with
her two United States citizen children: A.E. and L.E. A.E. suffers from mental and
physical disabilities, some of which are likely to be lifelong. While in the United
States, Petitioner played a key role in ensuring A.E. received physical therapy and
special education support—both vital to A.E.’s wellbeing and continued progress.
All was quiet until May 29, 2009, when police arrested Petitioner for driving
without a license. She pleaded guilty and paid the associated fines. As a result of the
traffic violation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained Petitioner
2 Appellate Case: 21-9562 Document: 010110725741 Date Filed: 08/17/2022 Page: 3
and began removal proceedings. Pursuant to the then-prevailing practice, the
Government issued Petitioner a notice to appear ordering her to appear before an
immigration judge on a date and time “to be set.” Five months later, the Government
sent Petitioner a notice of hearing setting the date and time of her hearing.
At the hearing, Petitioner appeared unrepresented and conceded the charge
contained in the notice to appea