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2022 Supreme(US)(ca1) 46

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
G. D. – Appellant
Versus
Swampscott Public Schools – Respondent



No. 20-2114

G.D., by and through her Parents and Next Friends, JEFFREY and MELISSA D.,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

SWAMPSCOTT PUBLIC SCHOOLS; BUREAU OF SPECIAL EDUCATION APPEALS,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Howard, Chief Judge, Barron, Circuit Judge, and Singal, District Judge.

Robert E. Curtis, Jr., with whom Melissa S. Dragon was on brief for appellants. Felicia S. Vasudevan, with whom Doris R. MacKenzie Ehrens and Murphy, Hesse, Toomey & Lehane, LLP were on brief for appellees.

February 7, 2022

 Of the District of Maine, sitting by designation. BARRON, Circuit Judge. Jeffrey and Melissa D., on behalf of their child ("G.D."), sought a determination from the Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals ("BSEA") that G.D.'s public school district failed to provide her with a free appropriate public school education as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. They also sought reimbursement from the school district for tuition expenses associated with their unilateral placement of G.D. at a nearby private school. After a hearing, the BSEA denied their claims, and they filed suit against the school district and the BSEA in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The District Court granted judgment to the defendants. We affirm.

I.

A.

The IDEA requires states that receive federal financial assistance under the statute to offer eligible children with disabilities a "free appropriate public education," or, as it is often called, a "FAPE." See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). "'The primary vehicle for delivery of a FAPE' is an Individualized Education Program ('IEP')." Johnson v. Boston Pub. Schs., 906 F.3d 182, 185 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2012)).

- 2 - An IEP is the primary "means by which special education and related services" are provided to an eligible child, see Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994, and it is composed of "a written statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with" federal law and regulations. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.324; 603 Mass. Code Regs. 28.05. That written statement must include "the child's present level of educational attainment, the short- and long-term goals for his or her education, objective criteria with which to measure progress toward those goals, and the specific services to be offered." Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2008); see also 603 Mass. Code Regs. 28.05(4).

In Massachusetts, school districts are responsible for the development and administration of IEPs. See 603 Mass. Code Regs. 28.10. A school district must take care to ensure, in satisfying the IDEA's requirement that eligible children be provided with a FAPE, that the IEP is "reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances." Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.

If, upon issuance of the IEP by the relevant school district, the parents of the child receiving the IEP believe that the IEP is not "reasonably

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