[PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 23-12578 ____________________

SHERYL GLOVER, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 9:20-cv-80053-DMM ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-12578 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 02/04/2025 Page: 2 of 27

2 Opinion of the Court 23-12578

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No. 23-12579 ____________________

CATHY BOOZE, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 9:20-cv-80135-DMM ____________________

Before BRASHER, ED CARNES, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. WILSON, Circuit Judge: This consolidated appeal requires us to decide whether De- fendant-Appellant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (Ocwen) 1 violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) when it charged

1 Ocwen has since been succeeded by PHH Mortgage Corporation by merger. USCA11 Case: 23-12578 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 02/04/2025 Page: 3 of 27

23-12578 Opinion of the Court 3

consumers optional fees for making expedited mortgage payments online or by phone. Plaintiff-Appellees Sheryl Glover and Cathy Booze argue Ocwen’s “Speedpay fees” were an unconscionable means of collecting a debt under the FDCPA, which prohibits “col- lection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or ex- pense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permit- ted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). District courts in the Eleventh Circuit and around the coun- try are split over whether the FDCPA prohibits loan servicers from collecting “pay-to-pay” or “convenience” fees for the use of certain payment methods. In this case, the district court held that it does and awarded judgment to Glover and Booze. Most judges in the Middle and Southern Districts of Florida have reached the opposite conclusion—finding that convenience fees are neither part of nor incidental to the transferred debt, but separate fees paid voluntarily for a separate service. When viewed in isolation, this conclusion has some merit. But it overlooks the broader context in which debt collection activities occur. Ocwen’s convenience fees may have been optional, but it charged those fees to consumers who had no option but to do business with it. After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we hold that Ocwen violated the FDCPA because it is a “debt col- lector” who charged an “amount” that was not “expressly author- ized