[PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 22-10230 ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus RONDELL HALL,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00286-KD-C-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 2 of 18

2 Opinion of the Court 22-10230

Before BRANCH, BRASHER, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges. BRASHER, Circuit Judge: This appeal presents a question of first impression about su- pervised release and home confinement. The relevant statutes pro- vide that a district court may impose home confinement with elec- tronic monitoring in two circumstances. First, a district court may impose home confinement as a special condition of probation or supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(19). Second, a court may impose home confinement to punish a supervised release vio- lation under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(4). In both instances, Congress specified that district courts may order home confinement with electronic monitoring “only as an alternative to incarceration.” Id. §§ 3563(b)(19), 3583(e)(4). Considering this limitation, the question for us is whether a district court may sentence a defendant to home confinement for violating the terms of his supervised release even if the district court has sentenced the defendant to the statutory maximum period of imprisonment for that violation. We join the Fifth Circuit in answering this question “no.” See United States v. Ferguson, 369 F.3d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 2004). Rondell Hall, a class C felon, violated the conditions of his supervised release. After revoking his supervised release, the dis- trict court sentenced Hall to the statutory maximum of two years’ imprisonment and added one year of home confinement with lo- cation monitoring. We conclude that Hall’s sentence is incon- sistent with the limitation that a district court may impose home confinement “only as an alternative to incarceration.” Because the USCA11 Case: 22-10230 Document: 33-1 Date Filed: 04/05/2023 Page: 3 of 18

22-10230 Opinion of the Court 3

district court sentenced Hall to the statutory maximum term of two years’ imprisonment, it lacked authority to impose an addi- tional year of home confinement with electronic monitoring “as an alternative to incarceration.” We therefore vacate Hall’s sentence to the extent it imposed a term of home confinement and remand for resentencing. I.

The story of how Hall received the sentence at issue in this appeal begins in 2016, when he pleaded guilty to unlawful posses- sion of a firearm as a convicted felon, a class C felony. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After Hall served fifty-seven months in prison, he began a three-year term of supervised release. Hall’s supervised release included the conditions that he: (1) refrain from committing an- other crime, (2) keep his probation officer apprised of his current