[PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 21-12834 ____________________ HEREDEROS DE ROBERTO GOMEZ CABRERA, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant. versus TECK RESOURCES LIMITED,

Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-21630-RNS ____________________ USCA11 Case: 21-12834 Date Filed: 08/12/2022 Page: 2 of 16

2 Opinion of the Court 21-12834 Before NEWSOM, MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and COVINGTON,* Dis- trict Judge. NEWSOM, Circuit Judge: In 1996, in response to the Cuban government’s decades-old program of confiscating private property, Congress enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act—commonly called the Helms-Burton Act. That statute broadly imposes liability on anyone who “traffics” in confiscated Cuban property to which a U.S. national has a claim. The plaintiff in this case, a Florida LLC called Herederos de Roberto Gomez Cabrera, sued a Canadian company, Teck Resources Limited, alleging that it had illegally trafficked in property to which Herederos says it has a claim. We hold that the federal courts don’t have personal jurisdiction over Teck, and we therefore affirm the dismissal of Herederos’s com- plaint. I In 1960, the revolutionary Cuban government confiscated Roberto Gomez Cabrera’s mineral mines. Cabrera’s children, who inherited his claim to the mines, allege that Teck, a Canadian cor- poration, managed the mines and thereby “traffic[ked]” in them in violation of the Helms-Burton Act.

*Honorable Virginia M. Hernandez Covington, Senior United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation. USCA11 Case: 21-12834 Date Filed: 08/12/2022 Page: 3 of 16

21-12834 Opinion of the Court 3

Cabrera’s children assigned their claims to a Florida LLC, Herederos de Roberto Gomez Cabrera, and Herederos sued Teck under the Helms-Burton Act in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Broadly speaking, the Act imposes li- ability on “any person” who “traffics in property which was confis- cated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959.” 22 U.S.C. § 6082. Teck moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic- tion. The district court granted Teck’s motion, holding that Flor- ida’s long-arm statute didn’t provide jurisdiction over Teck and, additionally, that Teck lacked the necessary connection to the United States to establish personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). For the reasons explained below, we agree with the district court.1

1 We review the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true. See Don’t Look Me- dia LLC v. Fly Victor Ltd., 999 F.3d 1284, 1292 (11th Cir. 2021). “When a defendant submits non-conclusory affidavits to controvert the allegations in the complaint, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence to support personal jurisdiction.” Id. Teck separately contends that Herederos lacks Article III standing to sue. Because “there is no mandatory sequencing of jurisdictional issues,” and because “in appropriate circumstances . . . [we] may dismiss for lack of per- sonal jurisdiction without first establishing subject-matter jurisdiction,” we re- solve this case without addressing Herederos’s standing. Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 54