2021 Supreme(US)(ca11) 91
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Richard Hunstein – Appellant
Versus
Preferred Collection and Management Services Inc. – Respondent
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 19-14434 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-00983-TPB-TGW
RICHARD HUNSTEIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus PREFERRED COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ________________________
(April 21, 2021) Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges. NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents an interesting question of first impression under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act—and, like so many other cases arising under USCA11 Case: 19-14434 Date Filed: 04/21/2021 Page: 2 of 23
federal statutes these days, requires us first to consider whether our plaintiff has Article III standing.
The short story: A debt collector electronically transmitted data concerning a consumer’s debt—including his name, his outstanding balance, the fact that his debt resulted from his son’s medical treatment, and his son’s name—to a third- party vendor. The third-party vendor then used the data to create, print, and mail a “dunning” letter to the consumer. The consumer filed suit alleging that, in sending his personal information to the vendor, the debt collector had violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), which, with certain exceptions, prohibits debt collectors from communicating consumers’ personal information to third parties “in connection with the collection of any debt.” The district court rejected the consumer’s reading of § 1692c(b) and dismissed his suit. On appeal, we must consider, as a threshold matter, whether a violation of § 1692c(b) gives rise to a concrete injury in fact under Article III, and, on the merits, whether the debt collector’s communication with its dunning vendor was “in connection with the collection of any debt.”
We hold (1) that a violation of § 1692c(b) gives rise to a concrete injury in fact under Article III and (2) that the debt collector’s transmittal of the consumer’s personal information to its dunning vendor constituted a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt” within the meaning of § 1692c(b).
2 USCA11 Case: 19-14434 Date Filed: 04/21/2021 Page: 3 of 23
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.
I
Congress enacted the FDCPA “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors” and “to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). To that end, § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA, titled “Communication with third parties,” provides that—
Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). The provision that § 1692c(b) cross-references—§ 1692b— governs the manner in which a debt co