[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________

No. 97-2319 ________________________

D.C. Docket No. 3:95-cv-00250-J-10

JOHN GARY HARDWICK, JR.,

Petitioner - Appellant, versus SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent - Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida ________________________

(September 18, 2015) Before TJOFLAT, HULL and MARTIN, Circuit Judges. Tjoflat, Circuit Judge: Case: 97-2319 Date Filed: 09/18/2015 Page: 2 of 48

In Hardwick v. Crosby (Hardwick III), 320F.3d1127(11th Cir. 2003), we determined that Petitioner Hardwick was due an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466U.S.668, 104S. Ct. 2052, 80L. Ed. 2d674(1984), during the penalty phase of his capital murder trial. While retaining jurisdiction over the appeal, we remanded the case to the District Court for the limited purpose of conducting that hearing. The District Court held the hearing and found that the attorney’s performance failed to meet Strickland’s standard. The court further found that, but for such failure, it was reasonably probable that Hardwick would not have been sentenced to death. The District Court therefore concluded that a writ of habeas corpus should issue as to the death sentence.

The District Court’s findings and conclusion are now before for us for review. We review the District Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Turner v. Crosby, 339F.3d1247, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003). The court’s finding of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed finding of fact and law, which we review de novo. Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184, 1198 (11th Cir. 1998).

2 Case: 97-2319 Date Filed: 09/18/2015 Page: 3 of 48

In the end, we agree with the District Court. Hardwick is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus setting aside his capital sentence and, unless the State provides him with a new penalty phase, requiring the imposition of a life sentence.1

I.

Hardwick III provides a highly detailed account of the facts and procedural history of Hardwick’s case. See 320F.3d1131–58. We recapitulate only those facts necessary to explain our disposition here.

Upset about the disappearance of his stash of quaaludes, Hardwick killed seventeen-year-old Keith Pullum in the early morning hours of December 24, 1984. On March 13, 1986, after a three-day trial, Hardwick was convicted of first- degree murder. At the penalty phase of the trial which followed, the State’s case consisted of establishing five statutory aggravating circumstances, which, the prosecutor argued, warranted a death-sentence recommendation.2 The prosecutor laid the groundwork for the first statutory aggravating circumstance by introducing

1 Hardwick also asks us to address an argument on which we reserved judgment in Hardwick III: whether his relationship with his attorney was so dysfunctional that continued representation constituted a conflict of interest and denied Hardwick his right to effective representation of counsel during the guilt phase. We find no merit in the argument and therefore reject it. The District Court’s original denial of rel