UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term, 2024

(Argued: February 27, 2025 Decided: April 10, 2025)

Docket No. 24-1459-cv

HAMILTON RESERVE BANK LTD.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

JESSE GUZMAN, ULTIMATE CONCRETE, LLC, INTERCOASTAL FINANCE LTD.,

Intervenors-Appellants,

— v. —

THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA,

Defendant.

B e f o r e:

LYNCH, ROBINSON, and NATHAN, Circuit Judges.

__________________ Jesse Guzman, Ultimate Concrete LLC, and Intercoastal Finance Ltd. appeal the denial of their motion to intervene in a suit brought by Hamilton Reserve Bank against the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. They argue that the district court erred when it applied a “common nucleus of operative fact” standard to conclude that it lacked supplemental jurisdiction over their claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). They contend that that analysis “ignored the well- established principle that a court necessarily possesses supplemental jurisdiction over intervention claims when the requirements for intervention as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) are met.” Appellants’ Br. 8 (underlining omitted). Because their claims met the Rule 24(a)(2) standard, they argue, their motion to intervene should have been granted. We disagree. Section 1367(a) explicitly sets out the requirements for supplemental jurisdiction over “claims that involve the . . . intervention of additional parties.” That provision grants a district court supplemental jurisdiction over claims that “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” shared with other claims over which the district court has jurisdiction. Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 2006), quoting Promisel v. First American Artificial Flowers, Inc., 943 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 31 (2025). It may be true that claims that meet the standard for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) will often also meet that standard. But ultimately, Section 1367(a) – not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure – defines the boundaries of a federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction over a would-be intervenor’s claims. As the Rules explicitly state, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure does not “extend . . . the jurisdiction of the district courts.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 82. Thus, the district court applied the correct standard when it dismissed Appellants’ claims here. And because Appellants did not allege claims that share a “common nucleus of operative fact” with Hamilton Reserve Bank’s claims against Sri Lanka, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over those claims. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying intervention.

2 GRANT L. JOHNSON, McKool Smith P.C., New York, NY (James H. Smith, McKool Smith P.C., New York, NY, and Robert L. Edwards, Gordon Davis Johnson & Shane P.C., El Paso, TX, on the brief), for Intervenors-Appellants.

TOM M. FINI, Catafago Fini LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judge:

Hamilton Reserve Bank, the Appellee in this case, is the beneficial owner of $250,490,000 in Sri Lankan government bonds that matured on July 25, 2022. When Sri Lanka refused to pay on t