UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________

No. 20-1013 ____________

QUINTEZ TALLEY, Appellant

v.

PUSHKALAI PILLAI, Psychiatrist, SCI Greene; PA. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; U/K MHM1; JOHN E. WETZEL; CAPTAIN SHREDDER; LT. MORRIS; U/K DEFENDANTS ____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 2-18-cv-1060) District Judge: Honorable Cynthia R. Eddy ____________

Argued on May 20, 2024 Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and MCKEE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 6, 2024) Quintez Talley Camp Hill SCI P.O. Box 8837 2500 Lisburn Road Camp Hill, PA

Pro Se Appellant Natasha R. Khan [Argued] Regina Wang Brian S. Wolfman Alyssa Greenstein Ender McDuff Tae Min Kim Andrea Ojeda Tate Rosenblatt Carly Sullivan Georgetown University Law Center Appellate Courts Immersion Clinic 600 New Jersey Avenue, Suite 312 Washington, D.C. 20001 Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Cassidy L. Neal [Argued] Frank X. Petrini, III Baum O’Connor Cullen Chmiel 912 Fort Duquesne Boulevard Pittsburgh, PA 15222 Counsel for Appellee Pushkalai Pillai

2 Michael J. Scarinci [Argued] Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania Strawberry Square, 15th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17120 Daniel B. Mullen Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania 1251 Waterfront Place, Mezzanine Level Pittsburgh, PA 15222 Counsel for Appellees PA Department of Corrections, John E. Wetzel, Captain Shredder, and Lieutenant Morris _______________

OPINION OF THE COURT _______________ FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Quintez Talley seeks in forma pauperis (IFP) status, which would enable him to proceed in this appeal without prepaying his filing fees. Appellees contend that the “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) bars Talley from proceeding IFP. Under that provision, a prisoner accrues a “strike” when, on a “prior occasion[],” the prisoner brought an “action or appeal . . . that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Appellees contend that decisions in three of Talley’s cases constitute strikes that were in effect when he filed his notice of appeal. As discussed below, only one of

3 those decisions qualifies as a strike, so we will grant Talley’s motion to proceed IFP.

I Litigants who cannot afford to prepay the full cost of court fees may move to proceed IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Incarcerated plaintiffs who proceed IFP must still pay the fees, but they may do so in increments over the course of the litigation. Id. § 1915(b). The PLRA, however, imposes special restrictions on prisoners who seek IFP status. Under the statute’s “three strikes” provision, a prisoner is prohibited from proceeding IFP if, on three or more prior occasions while incarcerated, he has had a lawsuit “dismissed” for being “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ing] to state a claim.” Id. § 1915(g). The only exception to this rule is if the plaintiff is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Id. 1

In order for a dismissal to qualify as a strike, “the entire action or appeal” must have been dismissed on one of the three enumerated § 1915(g) grounds. Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 126 (3d Cir. 2013). Therefore, a “mixed dismissal”— where some claims were dismissed on enumerated grounds but the remaining claims were dismissed on other grounds—does not count as a strike. Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 280 (3d Cir. 202