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2020 Supreme(US)(ca3) 46

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Maureen Riccio – Appellant
Versus
Sentry Credit Inc – Respondent



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________

No. 18-1463 _____________

MAUREEN RICCIO, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Appellant

v.

SENTRY CREDIT, INC.; JOHN DOES 1-25

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey District Court No. 3-17-cv-01773 District Judge: The Honorable Brian R. Martinotti

Argued February 19, 2020

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, AMBRO, CHAGARES, JORDAN, HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, RESTREPO, BIBAS, PORTER, MATEY, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges (Filed: March 30, 2020) Joseph K. Jones [ARGUED] Benjamin J. Wolf Jones Wolf & Kapasi 375 Passaic Avenue Suite 100 Fairfield, NJ 07004 Counsel for Appellant Jacob C. Cohn [ARGUED] Gordon Reese Scully Mansukhani Three Logan Square 1717 Arch Street, Suite 610 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Peter G. Siachos Gordon Reese Scully Mansukhani 18 Columbia Turnpike Suite 220 Florham Park, NJ 07932 Counsel for Appellee

2 ____________________

OPINION OF THE COURT _____________________

SMITH, Chief Judge.

This case presents a question of statutory interpretation: does 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) allow debtors to orally dispute a debt’s validity? It also presents a question of stare decisis: should our en banc Court resolve a circuit conflict by overturning a three-decades-old panel decision which has been eroded by intervening Supreme Court authority? Because we answer both questions affirmatively, we will overrule Graziano v. Harrison’s contrary interpretation of § 1692g(a)(3) and affirm. I A

The statutory interpretation question arises from language which appears in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (FDCPA). The FDCPA protects against abusive debt collection practices

3 by imposing restrictions and obligations on third-party debt collectors. See §§ 1692b–1692j.

This case concerns one of those requirements: that debt collectors send debtors a letter notifying them of their right to dispute the debt. See § 1692g. Section 1692g(a) specifies five things the letter, often called a “validation notice,” must include: (1) the amount of the debt;

(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;

(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty- day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and

4 (5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. The question presented is whether the letter must require all disputes to be in writing, or whether § 1692g(a)(3) permits oral disputes. Before answering that question, it is instructive to examine other protections the FDCPA provides when debts are disputed. For instance, § 1692g(b) demands that: If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing withi

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